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DOCTRINE ON THE RUN: THE DEEPENING 
CIRCUIT SPLIT CONCERNING APPLICATION OF 
THE FUGITIVE DISENTITLEMENT DOCTRINE  
TO FOREIGN NATIONALS 
Abstract: The circuits are currently split on applying the fugitive disentitlement 
doctrine to a defendant who is a foreign national who resides outside of the 
United States and is being prosecuted in the United States for conduct that oc-
curred elsewhere. The doctrine provides that a fugitive is prohibited from seek-
ing relief from the justice system whose jurisdiction and authority they evade. 
Appropriate application of the doctrine is particularly important to foreign de-
fendants as it affects their ability to travel outside of their home country, main-
tain employment, and protect their personal reputation. This Note discusses the 
evolution of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and its current application to in-
ternational defendants. It argues that the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation and ap-
plication of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, as opposed to the Second Cir-
cuit’s, is correct because imposing fugitive status on foreign defendants who 
have never been to the United States does not serve the underlying purposes of 
the doctrine. Globalization has resulted in increased U.S. prosecution of foreign 
nationals, a trend that is expected to continue. Successfully prosecuting these 
individuals depends in part on the existence of a clear standard for determining 
the circumstances under which a defendant can be declared a fugitive. 
INTRODUCTION 
Roger Darin is a Swiss citizen who has never stepped foot in the Unit-
ed States.1 He is a former trader who worked for UBS in Singapore, Tokyo, 
and Zurich.2 In his capacity as a trader, his professional conduct was never 
aimed at the United States.3 His only connection to the United States was 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Darin v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1223 (2016) (No. 16-
564) [hereinafter Petition]. 
 2 Id. UBS is a global financial services company that is headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland 
with offices all around the world. UBS, http://www.ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs/about_us/our
profile.html [https://perma.cc/P9XD-AD7Q]. During the relevant time period of this case, UBS 
operated among wholly-owned subsidiaries in Japan and Singapore. Complaint at 5, United States 
v. Hayes (Hayes II), 118 F. Supp. 3d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12 MAG 3229). 
 3 See United States v. Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (describing the coun-
tries and currencies that Darin dealt with in his position, neither of which included the United 
States nor the American dollar). Darin’s primary responsibility at UBS was trading in short-
interest rates in Asia and Switzerland. Id. He was responsible for UBS’s Yen LIBOR submissions 
to the British Bankers’ Association (BBA). Id. None of his work involved working directly with 
entities in the United States. Id. 
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indirect, through his work with Thomson Reuters.4 Imagine his surprise 
when, on December 12, 2012, the United States government filed a criminal 
complaint against him.5 He was charged with conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and 18 U.S.C. § 1343.6 The complaint 
alleged that Darin’s conduct resulted in Thomson Reuters publishing mis-
leading Yen LIBOR fixings that were favorable to UBS trading positions.7 
An arrest warrant was issued but, as a Swiss citizen living in Switzerland, 
Darin has not been arrested.8 
On October 2, 2014, Darin’s attorneys filed a motion to dismiss, citing 
a Fifth Amendment violation and inappropriate extraterritorial application 
of U.S. law.9 Magistrate Judge James Francis IV, sitting on the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, found that the 
fugitive disentitlement doctrine did not bar the court from hearing Darin’s 
motion to dismiss and simultaneously denied the motion to dismiss.10 Judge 
Paul Crotty agreed in part and disagreed in part, determining that the fugitive 
disentitlement doctrine barred the court from hearing the merits of Darin’s 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Petition, supra note 1, at 8. The United States contends that Darin’s alleged manipulation of 
interest rates favored Tom Hayes’ trading positions and resulted in fraudulent trades inside the 
United States. Id. Although both individuals were not located in the United States, a counterpart of 
Hayes’ was located in Purchase, New York. Id. This means the only connection between Darin 
and the United States is that his manipulated interest rate affected the ultimate Yen-LIBOR inter-
est rate published by Thomson Reuters, which is published worldwide, including in the United 
States. Id. 
 5 Hayes II, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 623. The complaint listed three counts: conspiracy to commit 
wire fraud, wire fraud, and antitrust violations. Complaint, supra note 2, at 1–3. The complaint 
names as a co-defendant Tom Hayes, who was charged with all three counts whereas Darrin was 
only charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Id. Hayes was tried and convicted of eight 
counts of fraud for his role in manipulating LIBOR rates in an English court in August 2015. 
Hayes II, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 623 n. 2. 
 6 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (explaining conduct that constitutes wire, radio, and television 
fraud and accompanying punishment); id. § 1349 (stating that anyone who attempts or conspires 
to commit a crime enumerated in this chapter will be subjected to the same penalties as those 
listed for the offense, as if the underlying crime had been committed). 
 7 Complaint, supra note 2, at 21. “The Japanese Yen LIBOR interest rate is the average inter-
bank interest rate at which a large number of banks on the London money market are prepared to 
lend one another unsecured funds denominated in Japanese Yen.” Japanese Yen LIBOR Interest 
Rate, GLOBAL RATES, www.global-rates.com/interest-rates/libor/japanese-yen/japanese-yen.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/356Y-48AL]. 
 8 Hayes II, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 623. 
 9 Id. Darin argued that his Fifth Amendment right to due process was violated because there 
was an insufficient connection between him and the United States to support charging him in the 
United States. Id. He also claimed his Fifth Amendment right to due process was violated because 
he did not receive commensurate notice that his alleged conduct was criminal. Id. 
 10 See United States v. Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d 409, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (declining to deter-
mine Darin’s fugitive status because, even if he was a fugitive, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine 
would not be applicable to the facts of the case). After applying the rationales behind the doctrine 
to the facts of the case, the judge denied Darin’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 430–26. 
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motion to dismiss.11 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit granted the United States’ motion to dismiss and denied Darin’s pe-
tition for mandamus relief.12 
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine allows a court to deny a party’s 
request to make use of the American judicial system when they purposely 
evade the jurisdiction to avoid criminal prosecution.13 When a defendant 
purposefully removes himself from the court’s jurisdiction, he is signaling 
his disrespect for the judicial system and process.14 As a result, he should 
not be rewarded with benefits that stem from access to the appellate pro-
cess.15 Rationales supporting the doctrine include difficulty of enforcing a 
judgment against a fugitive, the idea that flight acts as a waiver of the right to 
appeal, discouragement of prisoner escape, and efficient operation of criminal 
appeals, to name a few.16 Another theory supporting this discretionary doc-
                                                                                                                           
 11 United States v. Hayes (Hayes II), 118 F. Supp. 3d 620, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12 
MAG 3229). The district court rejected the magistrate’s determination that Darin was not a fugi-
tive and that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine should not be applied. Id. at 629. The district 
court instead found that Darin was a fugitive because an arrest warrant was issued against him and 
he has actively avoided being arrested by staying in Switzerland. Id. at 626. The court did not 
believe that someone who otherwise would be considered a fugitive had they committed the crime 
in the United States, should not be labeled a fugitive just because of the impossibility of leaving 
the United States. Id. at 625. The court also found that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine applies 
because the four factors underpinning the doctrine counsel in favor of disentitlement. Id. at 626–
27. Finally, the district court explained why, if it were to review Darin’s motion to dismiss, it 
would fully adopt the magistrate judge’s order denying the motion. Id. at 627–29. 
 12 United States v. Hayes, at 1–2, No. 15-2597 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Appellate 
Order]. The judge explained that the district court’s order was not immediately appealable under 
the collateral order doctrine and therefore the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id. 
Additionally, the court found that Darin did not meet his burden of demonstrating “exceptional 
circumstances” that merit mandamus relief. Id. 
 13 28 U.S.C. § 2466 (2012). A judicial officer may forbid an individual from using the U.S. 
court system in furtherance of a claim if, after the individual has knowledge that a warrant has 
been issued for his apprehension, such individual flees the jurisdiction in order to avoid prosecu-
tion. Id. § 2466(a)(1)(A). The individual may be forbidden from using the court system for failing 
to enter or reenter the United States in order to submit to its jurisdiction. Id. § 2466(a)(1)(B). An 
individual who is in custody in another jurisdiction for illegal conduct in that jurisdiction is not a 
fugitive for purposes of this law. Id. § 2466(a)(2). 
 14 See Patrick J. Glen, The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine and Immigration Proceedings, 27 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 749, 754–55 (2013) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. 
Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 141 (1896), rested partially on enforceability grounds but also on the fact 
that fleeing after commencing the appeals process demonstrates irreverence for the process and 
tarnishes the court’s dignity). 
 15 See Paige Taylor, The Good, the Bad, the Ugly: A Survey of Selected Fifth Circuit Immi-
gration Cases, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 989, 1005 (2009) (explaining that the doctrine can be seen 
as an incentive device to keep convicted criminals from escaping because non-compliance with 
jail sentences divests the criminal of access to the appeals process). 
 16 See Estelle v. Dorough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975) (per curiam) (stating that the disentitle-
ment doctrine supports the sanctity of the appeals courts and promotes efficient operation of the 
appellate process). The Court also, for the first time, proposed that discouraging prisoner escape 
and supporting escapee self-surrender were valid rationales supporting invocation of the doctrine. 
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trine is preserving judicial resources by allowing appellate judges to deny a 
fugitive’s claim.17 The doctrine should be applied when (1) the defendant is 
determined to be a fugitive, and (2) when the four factors underlying the 
doctrine counsel disentitlement, considering principles such as mutuality 
and aversion to flouting the judicial system, and only then should the court 
forgo hearing the appeal.18 
Determining fugitive status, however, is not as simple as whether or 
not the defendant escaped prison or evaded law enforcement.19 There are 
two preliminary questions to answer: (1) whether actual flight is necessary 
to label someone a fugitive, and (2) whether a foreign defendant’s failure to 
surrender by remaining outside the country is sufficient to label them a fugi-
tive.20 Courts are divided on both of these questions.21 With no legal obliga-
                                                                                                                           
Id.; Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (explaining that flight from custody acts as 
a defendant’s waiver to claim a right of appeal and can disentitle him from seeking relief); Smith 
v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (addressing enforceability concerns). 
 17 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 179 F. Supp. 2d 270, 285–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 18 See Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, 111 F.3d 278, 280 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(discussing the four factors that determine whether the fugitive disentitlement doctrine should be 
applied to a defendant). Courts will weigh the following factors in deciding whether disentitlement 
is warranted: (1) whether a decision on the merits would be enforceable; (2) whether a defendant 
is flouting the judicial process; (3) whether a decision on the merits would encourage similarly 
situated defendants to act in the same manner; and (4) whether the government is prejudiced by 
the defendant’s continued evasion of authority. Id.; United States v. Hayes (Hayes II), 118 F. 
Supp. 3d 620, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12 MAG 3229). 
 19 See Hayes II, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 624–26 (reviewing various definitions of the word fugi-
tive). The court explained that the general public’s idea of a fugitive can be described based on a 
recent prisoner’s escape from the Clinton Correctional Facility in Dannemora, New York. Id. A 
fugitive is someone who flees. Fugitive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). More pre-
cisely, a fugitive is a suspect in a criminal case who evades prosecution, arrest or imprisonment by 
leaving the jurisdiction or hiding. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Bokhari, 757 F.3d 664, 672 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (explaining that the term fugitive may be used in subtly different ways depending on 
the various legal contexts in which the term is invoked); United States v. Blanco, 861 F.2d 773, 
779 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that a person can be classified as a fugitive if he learns, while outside 
of U.S. jurisdiction, that he will be indicted and makes no effort to return to the country); United 
States v. Catino, 735 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that a defendant does not have to actu-
ally flee in order to be labeled a fugitive by the court but that “intent to flee” suffices and this 
intent can be gleaned when an individual refuses to turn himself over to the authorities once he is 
aware that charges have been filed against him). 
 20 Hayes II, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 624; see also infra notes 105–108 and accompanying text 
(describing the different courts’ approaches to answering these two questions). 
 21 Compare In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 412–13 (7th Cir. 2009) (declaring foreign national not 
to be a fugitive when his only presence in the United States was over twenty years prior and unre-
lated to the case at bar), and In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 179 F. Supp. at 287 (explaining that an 
individual who constructively flees the jurisdiction is not a fugitive unless: (1) he was physically 
present in the jurisdiction when he allegedly committed the crime, (2) while he is outside of the 
jurisdiction he becomes aware that he is wanted for arrest, and (3) he chooses to remain outside of 
the jurisdiction to avoid facing charges), with 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a) (2012) (allowing the fugitive 
disentitlement doctrine to be applied in the civil forfeiture context to individuals who, after learn-
ing they are wanted by the authorities, refuse to enter the United States), and United States v. 
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tion to surrender himself to U.S. jurisdiction, how could a foreign national 
who has never been to the United States be considered a fugitive?22 In the 
event fugitive status is imposed on the defendant, the court must decide 
whether application of the doctrine to the case at bar serves the underlying 
interests.23 Just because a defendant is deemed a fugitive does not mean that 
the doctrine should automatically be invoked.24 Would it make sense to dis-
entitle a fugitive of his right to appeal under the doctrine if the sanction 
would not serve the purposes of the doctrine?25 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the historical development 
of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and its application and limitations.26 
Part II reviews the procedural history of Darin v. United States and com-
pares it to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Hijazi.27 Part III argues 
that the Seventh Circuit, in contrast to the Second Circuit, correctly applied 
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in In re Hijazi and the Supreme Court 
erred in denying Darin’s petition for certiorari, thereby not resolving the 
current circuit split.28 
                                                                                                                           
Hernandez, 2010 WL 2652495, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2010) (stating that the circumstances 
surrounding how an individual becomes a fugitive may be irrelevant because the crucial factor to 
examine is the individual’s intent to submit to the jurisdiction). 
 22 See United States v. Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d 409, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 416 (concluding that, 
based on the record before him, Darin is a foreign national who has never entered the United 
States and has not concealed his location from U.S. authorities but has simply chosen to remain in 
his home country of Switzerland). The judge did not reach a decision on whether Darin is a fugi-
tive, explaining rather that even if he were considered a fugitive, it would be improper to apply the 
fugitive disentitlement doctrine to the facts of the case. Id. 
 23 See Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 824–25 (1996), superseded on other grounds by 
statute, Civil Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 983, 985 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2466–2467) (reviewing the specific contextual factors of the 
case against the backdrop of the rationales underlying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in de-
ciding whether to invoke the doctrine). 
 24 See United States v. Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging 
that the doctrine grants the court discretionary authority to dismiss the appeal, however there is no 
per se requirement that the court must dismiss the appeal in these cases); Angelo M. Russo, The 
Development of Foreign Extradition Takes a Wrong Turn in Light of the Fugitive Disentitlement 
Doctrine: Ninth Circuit Vacates the Requirement of Probable Cause for a Provisional Arrest in 
Parretti v. United States, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 1041, 1051–52 (2000) (discussing various factors 
courts should consider, and the weight they should be accorded, in determining whether the doc-
trine should be invoked at all). The Supreme Court, in Cauwenberghe, took a “totality of the cir-
cumstances” approach in deciding whether to apply the doctrine and determined that prisoner 
escape is only one factor of many to consider. Russo, supra, at 1052. 
 25 See Petition, supra note 1, at 31 (explaining that once a defendant is labeled a fugitive, the 
court must look to the rationales behind the doctrine, and not just the fugitive label, in deciding 
whether to hear the motion). 
 26 See infra notes 29–110 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 111–163 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 164–193 and accompanying text. 
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I. EVOLUTION AND PURPOSE OF THE FUGITIVE  
DISENTITLEMENT DOCTRINE 
The power to manage the appeals process belongs to the courts them-
selves and is a broad and inherent power.29 The fugitive disentitlement doc-
trine emerged from this inherent power at the end of the 19th century when it 
was applied to prevent fugitives from making unfair use of the judicial sys-
tem.30 It was developed as a rule of criminal appellate procedure when it was 
invoked to dismiss the appeal of a convicted criminal who escaped from jail 
during the pendency of his appeal.31 At first, the doctrine was principally ap-
plied in criminal cases involving prison escapees.32 Since then, the doctrine 
has broadened its application to appeals filed by those not yet arrested or 
charged, but who leave the jurisdiction to avoid answering for an alleged 
crime, among other instances.33 Section A of this Part sets out the power of 
the federal courts to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.34 Section B 
discusses the original formulation of the doctrine and its application to es-
caped prisoners.35 Section C examines the complications arising from invok-
ing the doctrine against a foreign defendant living outside the United States.36 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Glen, supra note 14, at 751 (stating the fugitive disentitlement doctrine stems from the 
court’s inherent authority to regulate the appellate process); Russo, supra note 24, at 1049 (relying 
on Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for the assertion that appellate courts have 
the authority to promulgate procedural rules for their court so long as they are not in conflict with 
any other rule or the Constitution). 
 30 United States v. $40,877.59 in U.S. Currency, 32 F.3d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating 
the Supreme Court’s aversion to ruling on a motion when a favorable decision benefits the fugi-
tive defendant and an unfavorable decision can be avoided by the fugitive defendant). 
 31 See Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (exercising the Court’s inherent authority 
to dismiss an appeal of a criminal who escaped from prison); Gary P. Naftalis & Alan R. Fried-
man, Fugitive Disentitlement in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 2002, at 1 (explain-
ing that the doctrine initially arose as a mechanism of judicial construction granting appellate courts 
the power to dismiss appeals of defendants who remained fugitives at the time of their appeal). 
 32 E.g., Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 138 (1897); Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692, 692 
(1887); Smith, 94 U.S. at 97. 
 33 N. Brock Collins, Note, Fugitives and Forfeiture—Flouting the System or Fundamental 
Right?, 83 KY. L.J. 631, 637 (1994-1995). Courts have previously deemed defendants to be a 
fugitive based on their “state of mind.” Id.; see United States v. Eng, 951 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 
1991) (explaining that evading authorities does not necessitate a physical act). The court found 
that the defendant was a fugitive, despite being imprisoned overseas, because he had not made 
sufficient effort to return to the United States. Eng, 951 F.2d at 465. 
 34 See infra notes 37–54 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 55–84 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 85–110 and accompanying text. 
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A. Appellate Power to Disentitle Fugitives from the Right to Appeal 
The United States Constitution does not provide for an absolute right 
of appeal.37 The right to appeal was developed over time and has primarily 
been established via precedent and codified in rules of appellate proce-
dure.38 With no constitutional provision binding the United States Courts of 
Appeals to review an appeal, they are free to use their implied powers to 
formulate rules that allow for the most efficient operation of their courts.39 
The Supreme Court first articulated this principle in 1985 in Thomas v. 
Arn.40 The petitioner was convicted of homicide in Ohio state court.41 On 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (recognizing that the Constitution does 
not provide an absolute right to appeal and detailing how the right to appeal developed); see also 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (stating that the Constitution does not require the states 
to provide appellate courts or a right to appeal); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) 
(explaining that a state’s statute that did not allow for an appeal does not violate the Second and 
Fourth Amendments of the Constitution). Review by an appellate court after final judgment in a 
criminal case was not a right at common law, nor now a fundamental element of due process. 
McKane, 153 U.S. at 687. See generally U.S. CONST. (lacking any reference to an individual's 
right to appeal a court ruling). The Constitution does not mention anything about an individual’s 
right to appeal a court ruling. See generally Alexandra Reimelt, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains 
and Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV 871, 904 (2010) (discussing the government’s 
ability to strip a defendant of his right to appeal in exchange for a more favorable sentence in a 
plea agreement). 
 38 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (laying out the jurisdiction of federal appellate courts); 
FED. R. APP. P. 3 (explaining the process for filing a valid appeal); James E. Lobsenz, A Constitu-
tional Right to an Appeal: Guarding Against Unacceptable Risks of Erroneous Conviction, 8 U. 
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 375, 376 (1985) (explaining that almost every state in the United States 
recognizes a right to appeal in serious criminal cases either by statute or state court rule). 
 39 Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (explaining that the courts’ ability to exercise their implied powers is nec-
essary in order for them to exercise their given powers). The rule granting jurisdiction to appellate 
courts does not explicitly confer on the courts the authority to establish procedural rules governing 
their decisions, but this does not render rules they create inconsistent with the Constitution or federal 
statutes. Anthony Michael Altman, The Fugitive Dismissal Rule: Ortega-Rodriguez Takes the Bite 
out of Flight, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (1995). The courts will engage in rule making by work-
ing within the bounds of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in conjunction with their adjudica-
tion of cases. Id.; see Martha B. Stolley, Sword or Shield: Due Process and the Fugitive Disenti-
tlement Doctrine, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 751, 752 (1997) (stating the inherent powers of 
the federal courts are of immense importance in exercising their duties). Relying on Link v. Wa-
bash, Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), Stolley explains that the inherent powers the appeals 
courts have allows them to impose rules that demand “silence, respect, and decorum” in order to 
maintain the integrity of the court. Stolley, supra, at 752. 
 40 See 474 U.S. 140, 146 (1985) (stating that there is no dispute that the courts of appeals have, 
at a minimum, presiding power to formulate procedural rules for the management of litigation). 
 41 Id. at 142. Ms. Thomas was convicted of fatally shooting her common-law husband during 
an argument. Id. The Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County reversed the conviction, finding that 
the exclusion of testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome was error. Id. at 143. The Ohio Supreme 
Court reversed the appeals court, holding that the testimony was irrelevant to petitioner’s self-
defense claim and the prejudicial effect of the testimony would outweigh its probative value. Id. 
The petitioner subsequently sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio, which assigned the case to a magistrate judge. Id. The magistrate’s 
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appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the court 
announced that petitioner had waived her right to appeal by failing to file 
timely objections.42 On petition of certiorari to the Supreme Court, the 
Court held that, so long as an appellate court’s rule did not clash with the 
Constitution or a statute, the court was free to devise its own rules that al-
low for the most efficacious operation of judicial proceedings.43 
The right to punish a party who fails to follow an appellate rule or who 
evinces disrespect in front of the court also derives from the court’s implied 
powers.44 The court can impose various penalties, including contempt sanc-
tions, exclusion of evidence or even denial of the right to a statutory ap-
peal.45 Because the court’s inherent powers are not subject to checks and 
balances, the rules must be narrowly tailored and invoked with restraint.46 
In order for a court-made rule to stand as a valid exercise of the court’s im-
plied powers it must meet three requirements: (1) the rule must not contra-
dict the Constitution, (2) the rule must be reasonable in terms of the interest 
it wishes to promote, and (3) the court must be vested with the authority to 
establish it through adjudication.47 
                                                                                                                           
report recommended that the writ be denied, concluding that omission of Battered Wife Syndrome 
testimony did not destroy basic fairness at the trial and therefore no sufficient ground for habeas 
relief exists. Id. at 144. 
 42 Id. The petitioner did not file a timely appeal to the judge’s report so the district court judge 
dismissed the case. Id. Without reaching the merits of the case, the Sixth Circuit relied on its hold-
ing in United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (1981), “which established the prospective rule that 
failure to file timely objections with the district court waives subsequent review in the court of 
appeals.” Id. 
 43 See id. at 155 (holding that a court of appeals has the authority to proscribe rules condition-
ing appeals so long as they do not violate the Federal Magistrates Act or the Constitution); see 
also Altman, supra note 39, at 1049 (discussing the holding in Thomas allowing appellate courts 
to create rules that best allow them to run their courtrooms). 
 44 See Stolley, supra note 39, at 752 (explaining that the implied powers provide the courts 
with the ability to impose rules or penalties in order to command order in the court); see also infra 
note 52 and accompanying text. 
 45 Stolley, supra note 39, at 752–53 (relying on various cases where these types of punish-
ments were upheld for parties who defied the authority of the appellate court); see, e.g., Roadway 
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763–64 (holding that sanctions for failure to comply with 
discovery orders is a valid penalty to impose based on an individual’s conduct or in order to deter 
others from engaging in similar conduct). 
 46 Piper, 447 U.S. at 754. Although invocation of inherent powers should be done with re-
straint, there exist particular circumstances where federal courts should exercise their inherent 
power to assess attorney’s fees against counsel. Id.; see Stolley, supra note 39, at 753 (explaining 
that the lack of democratic controls on the rule-making procedure renders the court-made rules 
particularly powerful and therefore must be exercised carefully). 
 47 See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 145–53 (1985) (detailing the Court’s reasoning in deter-
mining whether the Sixth Circuit’s exercise of inherent power to dismiss the appeal was valid). 
The Court did not lay these factors out in this manner, but these are the factors they examined in 
rendering their decision. See id. 
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Appellate courts long ago reached consensus that they have the right to 
sanction a defendant who files a post-conviction appeal and thereafter escapes 
custody by dismissing the appeal, as this practice complies with the above 
framework.48 The fugitive disentitlement doctrine, which emerged from this 
practice and has subsequently matured, is not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion.49 The doctrine does not appear to be in conflict with any federal stat-
ute.50 The rule is reasonable in achieving the interests, including deterring 
escape, encouraging self-surrender, promoting enforceability of rulings and 
furthering efficient and dignified operation of appellate courts, the court 
wishes to promote.51 Finally, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure confer 
on the courts broad rule-making power.52 This broad power affords the court 
the right to create the doctrine through adjudication in its court.53 According-
ly, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and its corollary sanctions on criminal 
defendants are well within the court’s rule-making power.54 
B. Criminals on the Lam: Dismissal of Post-Conviction Appeals 
It is well established that an appeals court has the right to dismiss a 
post-conviction appeal of a criminal who subsequently flees from prison.55 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (holding that courts may dismiss a 
defendant’s pending appeal if he escapes custody during the pendency period); Smith v. United 
States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (announcing the court’s ability to dismiss an escaped prisoner’s 
appeal); United States v. Amado, 754 F.2d 31, 31 (1st Cir. 1985) (concluding that dismissal of an 
appeal with prejudice is acceptable if the petitioner flees after filing the appeal). 
 49 See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (recognizing that there is no consti-
tutional right to an appeal and that it is entirely a statutory invention). 
 50 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). The provision states that courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction 
over all appeals from decisions of all district courts of the United States. Id.; Jason Joseph, The 
Fugitive Dismissal Rule Applied to Pre-Appeal Fugitivity, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1086, 
1097 (1994). In his dissenting opinion, on other grounds, in Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the fugitive dismissal rule does not violate a state statute con-
ferring a right to appeal on criminal defendants because the statute does not establish the proce-
dural requirements to file a valid appeal. 507 U.S. 234, 253 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); 
Joseph, supra, at 1097. 
 51 Altman, supra note 39, at 1051–58 (illustrating the rule’s reasonableness by virtue of its 
continued use over time); see, e.g., Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 141 (1896) (holding that the 
defendant’s escape from custody deprived him of his right to appeal his conviction). 
 52 FED. R. APP. P. 47. “Each court of appeals acting by a majority of its judges in regular ac-
tive service may, after giving appropriate public notice and opportunity for comment, make and 
amend rules governing its practice.” Id. 47(a). “A court of appeals may regulate practice in a par-
ticular case in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and local rules of the circuit.” 
Id. 47(b); Altman, supra note 39, at 1051. 
 53 Altman, supra note 39, at 1051. 
 54 Id. at 1050. 
 55 D.J.R., Recent Cases, 19 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397, 429 (1950) (stating that dismissal of an 
escaped prisoner’s pending appeal is an established principle in the U.S. court system); see Smith, 
94 U.S. at 97 (noting that it is within the court’s discretion to decline to hear a criminal appeal 
unless the defendant appears before the court and can be bound by any judgment). 
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Ensuring that the defendant would be bound to the consequences of a de-
terminative ruling on the appeal, known as mutuality, was the central issue 
in the 1876 case of Smith v. United States.56 The Court posited that once the 
convicted party has escaped, he is not inclined to voluntarily surrender him-
self to the very authorities he evaded.57 It would be a waste of judicial re-
sources, the Court explained, to take the time to review an appeal and make 
a ruling when any order will have no functional effect.58 
The Supreme Court relied on this same reasoning in 1887 in deciding 
Bonahan v. Nebraska.59 The Court again refused to hear an appeal where 
there would be no opportunity for the judgment to be enforced until the plain-
tiff reappeared in the jurisdiction and came under control of the lower court.60 
In 1897, the Supreme Court proffered a new justification for fugitive 
disentitlement in Allen v. Georgia.61 The Court stated that by escaping from 
prison, the fugitive has committed yet another criminal offense; to conclude 
that this conduct acts as a waiver of his appeal is an extremely light punish-
ment.62 Justice Brown explained that the fugitive in effect mocks the court’s 
power by stating that he will return if his appeal is heard and there is a chance 
                                                                                                                           
 56 94 U.S. at 97. In this case, the plaintiff had escaped from jail and therefore was not actually 
or constructively under control of the court. Id. The court announced that it was not inclined to 
review and rule on an appeal when its ruling is likely to be ineffective. Id. Mutuality is concerned 
with binding the defendant to any judgment made by the court. See id. Mutuality is said to be 
lacking when a favorable judgment benefits the defendant and an adverse judgment has no effect 
on the defendant. United States v. Hayes (Hayes II), 118 F. Supp. 3d 620, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(No. 12 MAG 3229). Under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, a lack of mutuality counsels in 
favor of disentitlement. Id. 
 57 See Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (discussing the Court’s rationale in Smith 
in deciding whether to review defendant’s appeal). The likelihood of voluntary surrender is further 
reduced when it is doubtful that the fugitive will get a favorable pronouncement from his pending 
appeal. Id. 
 58 Id. The Court reasoned that if it were to affirm the plaintiff’s conviction, he would be un-
likely to reappear and submit himself to the ruling. Id. If the court were to reverse his conviction 
and order a new trial, the plaintiff may or may not present himself to be bound by the order. Id. As 
a result, it seemed pointless to hear and decide a case whose outcome may be unenforceable. Id. 
 59 125 U.S. at 692 (announcing that, because the plaintiff had escaped, and was not under 
control of the lower court by being either in custody or out on bail, his appeal must be set aside 
until he is recaptured). 
 60 Id. 
 61 166 U.S. 138, 141 (1896) (stating that, because the act of escaping from prison is its own 
distinct crime, it is appropriate to treat this conduct as the escapee’s waiver of his right to file an 
appeal). This case marked the first extension of the doctrine’s rationales by asserting that a de-
fendant’s flight after commencing the appellate process evidences contempt for the process and 
damages the dignity of the judicial system. Glen, supra note 14, at 754–55. 
 62 Glen, supra note 14, at 754; see Commonwealth v. Andrews, 97 Mass. 543, 544 (1867) 
(“So far as the defendant had any right to be heard under the Constitution, he must be deemed to 
have waived it by escaping.”).  
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for retrial but if the court denies the appeal, he will never submit to its rule.63 
The Court also drew upon its precedent in civil cases to further justify its de-
cision to deny a fugitive’s appeal, explaining that it was the Court’s common 
practice to dismiss a case when no dispute remained or the parties had come 
to a settlement agreement.64 The Court saw no reason to limit this custom to 
the civil context.65 The doctrine was later expanded to apply to other classes 
of fugitives, such as those who did not escape from jail.66 
Early applications of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine were primari-
ly concerned with enforceability issues and disentitlement as an appropriate 
sanction.67 As tougher cases presented themselves, the courts voiced other 
rationalizations in support of the doctrine’s purpose.68 For example, the Su-
preme Court opined that allowing discretionary dismissal of a prisoner’s 
pending appeal discourages escape and promotes self-surrender after es-
cape.69 Some states enacted their own statutes that automatically dismissed 
an appeal once a prisoner escaped and provided that the appeal could only 
be reinstated if the prisoner self-surrendered within a fixed period of time.70 
In 1975 the Supreme Court referenced these justifications in Estelle v. Dor-
                                                                                                                           
 63 Allen, 166 U.S. at 141; see Stolley, supra note 39, at 754 (explaining that this phenomenon 
permits the fugitive to dictate his terms for surrender and that the court should not reward this 
disrespect for their authority). 
 64 Allen, 166 U.S. at 140. The Court relied on California v. San Pablo & T.R. Co., 149 U.S. 
308 (1893) (stating that the case must be dismissed because the obligation by the defendant to pay 
sums of money to the state terminated when defendant deposited money in a bank for the state, 
giving the state everything it could have recovered in an action); Little v. Bowers, 134 U.S. 547 
(1890) (holding that reversal or affirmance of certain taxes already paid would have no signifi-
cance because they are not the taxes in controversy in the case at bar); and Dakota Co. v. Glidden, 
113 U.S. 222 (1885) (holding that a valid compromise and settlement extinguishes a cause of 
action). 
 65 Allen, 166 U.S. at 140. As long as the lower court has acted within the constitutional laws 
of its state and has conformed to procedural practice, the Supreme Court should seldom interfere 
with its ruling and pronounce that there had been a violation of due process. Id. 
 66 See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 365–66 (1970). In Molinaro, the defendant had 
been released from prison on bail and failed to appear in court. Id. The refusal to appear does not 
make the case nonjusticiable but rather the defendant should not be allowed to use the court sys-
tem to his benefit when he has expressly disrespected its authority. Id.; Eisler v. United States, 338 
U.S. 189, 190 (1949). The petitioner fled from the country after a grant for his petition for a writ 
of certiorari. Eisler, 338 U.S. at 190. Relying on Smith and Bonahan, the Court announced that it 
would adhere to its precedent and that the petitioner’s case would be removed from the docket. Id. 
 67 Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 240 (1993) (relying on the Court’s deci-
sions in Smith, Bonahan, and Eisler to demonstrate these were the court’s original key concerns in 
applying the doctrine). 
 68 See Estelle v. Dorough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975) (per curiam) (announcing that deterring 
prisoner escape and encouraging escapee self-surrender also supported the purposes underpinning 
the doctrine); see also Glen, supra note 14, at 752 (noting that although the doctrine has evolved 
from its primary purpose of ensuring compliance with court decisions, the different rationales that 
have allowed for the evolution build on one another). 
 69 Estelle, 420 U.S. at 537. 
 70 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.09 (West 1966) (repealed 1986). 
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ough, and upheld, in the face of an equal protections claim, the constitu-
tionality of a statute that mandated automatic dismissal of a prisoner’s pend-
ing appeals at the time of his escape.71 The Court also stated that the statute 
promotes the “efficient, dignified operation of the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals.”72 The concern for efficient operation of the courts constituted a 
new principle underlying the doctrine: promotion of fairness in the adver-
sarial process.73 
The Supreme Court has firmly settled that the fugitive disentitlement 
doctrine permissibly strips the right to a decision on the merits of a pending 
appeal from fugitives while also demarcating the bounds of its application 
by declining to encompass prior fugitives who later wish to make use of the 
appellate process.74 In 1993, in Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, the Su-
preme Court decided whether the same rationales similarly justified a rule 
that mandates automatic dismissal of an appeal from a criminal whose flight 
and recapture occurred post-sentencing but prior to the filing of an appeal.75 
The case signaled a pullback on the previously expanding fugitive disenti-
tlement doctrine.76 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit had previously extended the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to a 
                                                                                                                           
 71 420 U.S. at 541. The Supreme Court found that the statute’s creation and treatment of two 
separate classes (prisoners with different sentences and prisoners returned to prison under different 
circumstances) was not violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 537–39. The Constitution 
does not say things that are factually different should be treated legally the same. Id. at 538. 
 72 Id. at 537. The Court relied on Loyd v. State, 19 Tex. Ct. App. 137, 155 (1885), which 
addressed the time period a court should wait for a prisoner to surrender himself in order to rule on 
his appeal and coming to the conclusion that the courts should not operate on a prisoner’s sched-
ule. Id. 
 73 See Stolley, supra note 39, at 755 (noting the new justification for the fugitive disentitle-
ment doctrine announced by the Court in Estelle); see also Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 
U.S. 234, 249 (1993) (relying on United States v. Holmes, and acknowledging that when a long 
period of fugitivity coincides with a pending appeal, the government’s case may become improp-
erly prejudiced by the delay in commencement of appellate proceedings). Factors that may nega-
tively affect the government’s case after undue delay are the fact that witnesses become harder to 
locate and memories fade as time passes. Stolley, supra note 39, at 755. 
 74 Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 239–49. The Court examined the long history and develop-
ment of the doctrine, as rationales were added, and where the court declines to extend application 
of the doctrine. See id.; see also supra notes 55–73 and accompanying text; infra notes 75–84 and 
accompanying text. 
 75 507 U.S. at 242. The petitioner was convicted of various narcotics charges. Id. at 237. He 
did not appear for sentencing, was sentenced in absentia and was apprehended eleven months 
after the sentencing date. Id. The petitioner’s attorney filed a motion to vacate the sentence and for 
resentencing. Id. at 238–39. Only the former was granted and the petitioner subsequently filed an 
appeal to the denied motion for resentencing. Id. 
 76 Altman, supra note 39, at 1048. The Court’s holding halted the expanding application of 
the doctrine by allowing defendants who escaped from custody prior to filing an appeal to file an 
appeal once they are recaptured or self-surrender. Id.; see also Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 251 
(holding that when a defendant’s flight and recapture both happen prior to filing an appeal, there 
lacks a sufficient nexus between the defendant’s past fugitive status and the appellate process that 
would warrant dismissal via the fugitive disentitlement doctrine). 
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petitioner who failed to appear for post-conviction sentencing but was re-
captured before filing his appeal.77 As the Eleventh Circuit offered no ex-
planation for its decision, the Supreme Court engaged in a thorough analy-
sis to make a proper determination on the relevance of the doctrine to this 
particular class of petitioners.78 The Court noted that allowing the court of 
appeals to exercise discretion in dismissing an appeal presupposes a nexus 
between the petitioner and the appellate process.79 When a would-be peti-
tioner has yet to file an appeal, their absence from the jurisdiction has zero 
effect on the appellate process.80 The enforceability concern is non-existent 
here because appellate review has not yet been invoked.81 Similarly, the 
conduct of the petitioners in Ortega could not be said to be demonstrate 
disrespect for the appeals court because any disrespect evidenced from the 
defendant’s escape would be directed at the district court.82 Finally, the de-
terrence theory announced in Estelle is not persuasive for application of the 
doctrine in this case because the defendant remains under control of the dis-
                                                                                                                           
 77 United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1374 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), abrogated by 
Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. 234 (1993). The petitioner was convicted in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia for violation of federal narcotics laws in February 1979. 
Id. at 1373. The sentencing was set for March 29, 1979, but petitioner failed to appear and he was 
not recaptured until March 6, 1981. Id. The court found the reasoning in Molinaro to be equally 
persuasive, whether a convict flees before or after sentencing. Id. at 1374. To conclude otherwise 
would “fly in the face of common sense and sound reason.” Id. 
 78 See Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 234 (1993). The Court found the 
rationales relied upon by the Eleventh Circuit in Holmes did not support a rule dismissing an ap-
peal by a fugitive who is recaptured prior to invoking the appellate process. Id. 
 79 See id. at 244 (explaining that rationales for past application of the fugitive disentitlement 
doctrine assume a sufficient connection between the defendant and the appeals court such that a 
sanction imposed by the appeals court is justifiable). 
 80 See id. (stating that when a defendant’s flight from the jurisdiction and subsequent recap-
ture occur prior to invocation of the appellate process, where the defendant’s fugitive status never 
coincides with his appeal, the justification for allowing discretionary appellate dismissal becomes 
attenuated); United States v. Anagnos, 853 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1988) (declining to apply the hold-
ing in Holmes because the former fugitive’s misbehavior occurred when he was under the authori-
ty of the district court and therefore the consequences should be decided by the district court and 
not the appellate court); cf. United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating 
that a defendant who escapes during his trial but is recaptured after sentencing waives his right to 
appeal the conviction). Even though the period of fugitivity did not occur during the pendency of 
the appeal and thus did not delay those proceedings, a defendant who voluntarily leaves the juris-
diction during trial creates a myriad of problems and thus disentitlement is an appropriate sanc-
tion. See London, 723 F.2d at 1539. 
 81 Cf. United States v. Gordon, 538 F.2d 914, 915 (dismissing petitioner’s pending appeal, 
post-escape, explaining that a convicted party is unlikely to reappear if an adverse judgment is 
entered against him). 
 82 See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 246. The derisory conduct was aimed at the district 
court and by the rationales of Molinaro and Ali v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1986), that is the 
appropriate court to impose sanctions. Id. 
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trict court and has not yet created a nexus with the appellate process.83 As a 
result, the Court held that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine cannot be ex-
panded to deny the right of appeal to defendants who escaped and were re-
captured prior to filing an appeal.84 
C. Application of the Doctrine to International Parties 
The application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is aptly under-
stood and applied within U.S. boundaries.85 Alleged fugitives, however, do 
not always stay in the United States or they may never have been in the 
United States.86 At this juncture, challenges to jurisdiction often arise.87 
Compounding the challenge of jurisdiction, defendants who live in coun-
tries that do not have an extradition treaty with the United States have no 
legal obligation to travel to the United States and submit themselves to its 
jurisdiction.88 
International law recognizes the significance of prescribing laws that 
regulate individual conduct that occurs outside of a country if that conduct 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See id.; Katz v. United States, 920 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Lozada v. 
Deeds, 964 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the disentitlement doctrine is not a deterrent for 
escape when the defendant is still under the authority of the district court); cf. United States v. 
Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1374 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). Punishing an escapee through appel-
late dismissal “introduces an element of arbitrariness and irrationality.” Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 
U.S at 248 (citing Estelle v. Dorough, 420 U.S. 534, 544–45 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). The 
district court is adequately equipped to impose a punishment that efficaciously supports escape 
deterrence. Id. at 247–48. 
 84 Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 251 (1993) (noting that “the defendant’s 
former fugitive status may well lack the kind of connection to the appellate process that would 
justify an appellate sanction of dismissal” and that a district court is the correct authority to im-
pose a sanction when fugitivity occurs under its authority). 
 85 See id. at 239–40 (explaining that the doctrine is well accepted among the courts). 
 86 See Petition, supra note 1, at 7. Roger Darin is a Swiss citizen living in Switzerland who 
has never visited the United States. Id. 
 87 See Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 
116 (1983) (stating that the rapid expansion of international business has increased the number of 
claims in U.S. courts against foreigners and that exercising in personam jurisdiction over these 
defendants raises special problems). See generally Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Pro-
cess: Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 
(2006) (comparing the different treatments of the personal jurisdiction requirement for domestic 
and foreign defendants). 
 88 In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 2009). The court remarked that Hijazi was under 
no legal obligation to travel to the United States and as long as he did not voluntarily enter the 
country, he could not be forced to appear before the tribunal in the Central District of Illinois for 
arraignment. Id. The United States does not have an extradition agreement with Kuwait and as a 
result the Kuwaiti government is free to determine what it will do with Hijazi. See generally 
Countries with No Extradition Treaty with U.S., NBC (July 31, 2015, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.wsfa.com/story/22665099/countries-with-no-extradition-treaty-with-us 
[https://perma.cc/Z6HV-KV2X] (listing Kuwait as a country that does not have an extradition 
treaty with the United States). 
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is likely to have significant effects within the prescribing country.89 In order 
to maintain favorable and peaceable international relations, U.S. courts will 
interpret the extraterritorial application of facially ambiguous statutes in a 
manner least likely to impinge upon another country’s sovereignty.90 In so 
doing, “the courts have created a rebuttable presumption that federal stat-
utes regulate only domestic conduct.”91 
Seeing as federal statutes only regulate domestic conduct, foreign de-
fendants often file a motion to dismiss in addition to jurisdictional challeng-
es.92 Courts have discretion to hear or not hear a motion to dismiss, similar 
to their power to forgo hearing appeals, and contextual factors of a case will 
influence their decision.93 If, for example, the court determines that the de-
fendant is a fugitive, the underlying facts of the case may demand an appli-
                                                                                                                           
 89 Amie Cafarelli, Comment, Transnational Criminal Law—Non-Fugitive Foreign Defendant 
Entitled to Ruling on Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction Without Surrender-
ing—In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401 (7th Cir. 2009), 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 255, 257 
(2011); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 422, 423 (AM. LAW INST. 
1987) (listing restrictions on application of laws based on jurisdiction). International law curbs a 
country’s authority to control conduct that takes place outside the country’s confines. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(c). 
 90 EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). The Court noted that, absent clear 
congressional intent to the contrary, it is a longstanding principal that American legislation is 
meant only to apply within the United States. Id. The Court assumes Congress passes legislation 
following this canon of statutory interpretation. Id. This principle serves a compelling interest, 
which is to avoid conflict between the laws of the Unites States and the laws of foreign nations, 
which could lead to international tumult. Id. 
 91 Cafarelli, supra note 89, at 257 n.17. This presumption is only rebuttable upon a finding 
that Congress explicitly expressed an intent that the statute be applicable outside the United States. 
Id. The Supreme Court stated in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 444 (2007), that 
the controlling presumption on application of U.S. law is that it governs domestic conduct. See id. 
 92 See Hijazi, 589 F.3d at 405 (explaining that Hijazi filed a motion to dismiss after his initial 
indictment arguing that the statutes he is charged with violating cannot apply to “the conduct of 
foreign nationals outside the boundaries of the United States.”); Petition, supra note 1, at 33 (stat-
ing that Darin filed a motion to dismiss on October 2, 2014, based on an alleged insufficient nexus 
between himself and the United States, which is required under the Due Process Clause); Ugo 
Mattei & Jeffrey Lena, U.S. Jurisdiction Over Conflicts Arising Outside of the United States: 
Some Hegemonic Implications, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 381, 388 (2001) (explaining 
that defendants consistently file motions to dismiss in these matters [Holocaust claims] asserting 
that American courts lack jurisdiction to hear the claim or should decline to exercise jurisdiction). 
 93 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 681 (1985) (stating that the invocation of the 
fugitive disentitlement doctrine is based on equitable considerations); Eisler v. United States, 338 
U.S. 189, 194 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (stating that consideration of the interests at issue 
must be given when exercising discretion in deciding whether to apply the fugitive disentitlement 
doctrine); United States v. Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 1991) (weighing the fact 
that petitioner left the jurisdiction without obtaining necessary permission with the fact that he 
does not appear to be “flouting the judicial process” and is not attempting to gain an advantage 
over the court in deciding whether to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine); Hussein v. I.N.S., 
817 F.2d 63, 63 (9th Cir. 1986) (Norris, J., concurring) (explaining that the court has exercised 
discretionary authority in denying an appeal and that in cases of prisoner escape from federal 
custody there is no per se requirement of dismissal). 
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cation of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.94 This means the court is like-
ly justified in refusing to issue a ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
until they surrender themselves to the jurisdiction, despite no legal obliga-
tion to do so.95 This forces the defendant into a catch-22.96 
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine offers foreign defendants two un-
desirable options.97 If the defendant chooses not to travel to the United 
States, he will not be able to maintain any defenses against the charge(s).98 
It is very likely that INTERPOL will set up a “red notice” so that if the de-
fendant leaves his home country, he can be provisionally arrested, effective-
ly confining the defendant to his home country.99 In addition, the charges 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Compare Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (stating that an individual who 
escapes from constraints placed on him by the criminal justice system is unequivocally a fugitive 
and thus should be barred from asking the court to review his case), with Degen v. United States, 
517 U.S. 820, 829 (1996), superseded on other grounds by statute, Civil Forfeiture Reform Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 983, 985 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2466–2467) (concluding that the doctrine cannot be used to disentitle an individual in a civil 
forfeiture case under the auspices of him failing to appear in the United States to confront a differ-
ent set of charges). 
 95 Petition, supra note 1, at 33. This is the petitioner’s main concern. Id. at 34. If all foreign 
defendants are automatically deemed fugitives and the courts are permitted to apply the disenti-
tlement doctrine to all fugitives, regardless of whether doing so will serve the underlying purpos-
es, there will be no check on the government’s decision on how far to extend application of U.S. 
law internationally. Id. 
 96 See id. at 34 (detailing the factors the foreign defendant must consider in deciding whether 
to appear in the United States or not). What this amounts to is the following: The U.S. government 
can charge any foreign citizen for any foreign conduct aimed at the United States, so long as it 
violates a U.S. statute. Id. The constitutionality of the charge will remain safe from any scrutiny 
until the defendant willingly travels to the United States and submits to its jurisdiction. Id. at 33–
34. Most defendants in this predicament are unlikely to travel to the United States, because a basis 
for their claim is that it would be “fundamentally unfair to force them to appear in this country.” 
Id. 
 97 See Robert E. Connolly & Masayuki Atsumi, Defending the Foreign “Fugitive” Against 
the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine (Part 1), ANTITRUSTCONNECT BLOG (Mar. 21, 2017), www.
antitrustconnect.com/2017/03/21/defending-the-foreign-fugitive-against-the-fugitive-disentitlement-
doctrine [https://perma.cc/8X4R-TP5R] (detailing the consequences of either fighting the case 
from abroad or appearing in the United States). The foreign defendant faces unique consequences 
that a domestic defendant does not. Id. 
 98 Kaitlyn Golden, The “Fugitive Disentitlement” Doctrine Warrants a Close Look by the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 5, 2014), www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g
=03f2a359-0cde-4af5-a2ea-70a3dcc2fbab [http://perma.cc/7JK9-NDXT] (discussing a recent case 
where the district court refused to allow the defendant to put on a defense while remaining in his 
home country thereby forcing the defendant to remain in an insecure situation for the foreseeable 
future). United States District Judge James Selna of the Central District of California refused to 
hear defenses of Han Yong Kim, a South Korean citizen living and working in Seoul, who had 
been charged with foreign bribery under the FCPA. Id. Han Yong Kim maintains that he has not 
fled from the United States but has simply made the decision not to uproot his life to appear in the 
United States to face charges he does not believe are accurate. Id. 
 99 Golden, supra note 98 (explaining that issuance of an INTERPOL Red Notice essentially 
imposes an international travel ban on the flagged individual); see Red Notices, INTERPOL, https://
www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Notices/Red-Notices [http://perma.cc/3NRB-LUTF]. “A 
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and pending indictment will continue to follow the defendant, likely affect-
ing his ability to get work and his personal reputation.100 
If the defendant chooses to travel to the United States and is subse-
quently arrested, there is a strong likelihood that he would be denied bail 
because he poses a legitimate flight risk.101 In the off-chance the court 
grants the defendant bail, he may be required to remain in the United States 
until resolution of the case, taking him away from friends and family and 
potentially forcing him to give up his job back home.102 The defendant must 
proceed to trial unless a plea bargain is arranged.103 In the case of a plea 
bargain or conviction, the defendant would be subject to serving a prison 
sentence in the United States.104 
District Courts and Appellate Courts are divided on the application of 
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to non-U.S. citizens.105 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Georgia have held that a non-U.S. 
citizen is not a fugitive and the doctrine is not applicable unless the individ-
                                                                                                                           
Red Notice is a request to locate and provisionally arrest an individual pending extradition. It is 
issued by the General Secretariat at the request of a member country or an international tribunal 
based on a valid arrest warrant.” INTERPOL, supra. Once the red notice has undergone a compli-
ance check, it is published and it alerts police around the world that this individual is wanted for 
prosecution by a member country. Id. The Red Notice is particularly potent because it grants “high 
international visibility to cases” and by virtue of being logged into the Red Notice system, crimi-
nals/suspects are “flagged to border officials,” making international travel nearly impossible. Id. 
 100 Golden, supra note 98; Rebecca Shaffer, INTERPOL Red Notices: Towards Due Process and 
Human Rights Protection, GEO. J. INT’L AFF. (Dec. 9 2013), https://www.georgetownjournalof
internationalaffairs.org/online-edition/interpol-red-notices-towards-due-process-and-human-rights-
protection-by-rebecca-shaeffer?rq=Interpol [https://perma.cc/44S9-NDJY] (explaining that an IN-
TERPOL red notice, even when it does not result in an arrest, creates immigration and employment 
issues and is likely to affect the individual’s reputation and financial interests). Frequently, INTER-
POL notices are not thoroughly vetted for legitimacy before they go live, amounting to significant 
punishment without a trial on the merits. See Shafer, supra; Ethan E. Litwin, et al., The Third Way: 
The Constitutional Imperative of Allowing Foreign Nationals to Seek to Dismiss Indictments Prior to 
Arraignment, CONCURRENCES REV., no. 2, 2016, at 3. https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/
issues/No-2-2016/legal-practice/the-third-way-the-constitutional-imperative-of-allowing-foreign-
nationals-to-79482 [http://perma.cc/QWH6-KHFL]. 
 101 Golden, supra note 98. If the defendant is denied bail, he will be held in a prison cell and 
will be forced to defend himself from there. Id. 
 102 Id. Because cases of this nature are not quickly resolved, the defendant will likely have to 
remain in the United States for a number of years which will likely strain their personal and pro-
fessional interests back home. Id. 
 103 See Connolly supra note 97 (detailing the series of events that happens once the defendant 
sets foot in the United States). Preparing for trial is often expensive and can take years. Id. Many 
defendants cannot afford to remain in the United States for the pre-trial period so often agree to 
plead guilty under a plea agreement. Id. 
 104 Golden, supra note 98. 
 105 See In re Han Yong Kim, 571 Fed. App’x 556, 557 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting the existence of 
a circuit split on the vital question of whether fugitive disentitlement can be decided based on 
constructive flight of a defendant); infra notes 106–108 and accompanying text. 
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ual actually fled the United States in order to avoid prosecution.106 Other 
courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth and Elev-
enth Circuits and the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Texas accept the “constructive flight” theory announced in United States. 
v. Catino.107 This theory imposes fugitive status on a defendant who has not 
actually fled the jurisdiction but whose “intent to flee from prosecution may 
be inferred from a failure to surrender to authorities once he learns that charg-
es against him are pending.”108 The lack of uniformity in application of the 
fugitive disentitlement doctrine to non-U.S. citizen defendants raises im-
portant issues of fairness for both the defendant and the U.S. government.109 
Given that application of the doctrine has significant real-life consequences 
for individual defendants and for relations between the United States and oth-
er nations, a uniform application must be devised and implemented.110 
II. SECOND CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF THE FUGITIVE DISENTITLEMENT 
DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES V. DARIN SERVES NONE OF THE  
UNDERLYING RATIONALES FOR THE DOCTRINE 
After being charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349, feder-
al law that makes it illegal to transmit information relating to a scheme to 
defraud, Darin filed a motion to dismiss.111 The case made its way to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which upheld the 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 409–10 (7th Cir. 2009) (concluding that a Lebanese citizen 
residing in Kuwait should be allowed to maintain a defense without traveling to the United States 
because invoking the doctrine would not serve any of its purposes); United States v. Pub. Ware-
housing Co., 2011 WL 1126333, *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2011) (allowing a Kuwaiti company to 
dispute service of a criminal complaint without having to travel to the United States, which would 
otherwise vitiate the service rules). 
 107 In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 557 (6th Cir. 1995); Schuster v. United States, 765 F.2d 1047, 
1050–51 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Oliveri, 190 F. Supp. 2d 933, 936 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 
 108 United States v. Catino, 735 F.2d 718, 724 (2d Cir. 1984). The court announced that the 
doctrine must apply to those who actually flee once they are on notice that charges have been filed 
against them as well as to those individuals who are outside of the United States who know of the 
charges but refuse to submit to U.S. jurisdiction. Id. 
 109 See Golden, supra note 98 (discussing the various issues of fairness that pertain to both 
sides of the controversy). The author discusses whether it is fair to call someone a fugitive if they 
were never in the United States or had left the country long before any charges were filed. Id. By 
making use of the constructive flight theory, which is a legal fiction, do courts lose legitimacy by 
using that to secure a beneficial outcome for the government although there is no practical basis in 
fact for that outcome? Id. Is it fair to force the court to rule on a motion when an adverse ruling 
will not truly bind the party affected by the decision? Id. The way these questions are decided end 
up having very real-life consequences for both the foreign defendant and the U.S. government. Id. 
 110 United States v. Hayes (Hayes II), 118 F. Supp. 3d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12 
MAG 3229). The motion stated that the complaint failed to establish a competent nexus between 
Darin and the United States in compliance with Due Process under the Fifth Amendment. Id. 
 111 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Roger Darin’s Motion to Dismiss the Crim-
inal Complaint, Hayes II, 118 F. Supp. 3d 620 [hereinafter Defendant’s Memorandum]. 
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district court’s decision finding Darin to be a fugitive and refusing to review 
the merits of his motion to dismiss.112 This decision stands in stark contrast 
to the 2009 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in In re Hijzai.113 The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the doctrine and 
final holding are proper considering the purposes behind the fugitive disen-
titlement doctrine, and the Supreme Court was incorrect in denying certio-
rari to Darin.114 Section A of this Part reviews the procedural history of 
United States v. Darin, predating the filing of the petition for certiorari with 
the United States Supreme Court.115 Section B sets out the facts and proce-
dure of In re Hijazi, highlighting the conspicuous similarity of facts with 
Darin.116 Section C explains why the Seventh Circuit, rather than the Sec-
ond Circuit, appropriately employs the doctrine.117 
A. Procedural Posture of United States v. Darin 
In support of his motion to dismiss, Darin relied on both procedural 
and substantive arguments.118 The United States opposed the motion, rely-
ing on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.119 A magistrate judge for the 
United States District for the Southern District of New York rejected the 
United States’ insistence that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine precluded 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Petition, supra note 1, at 9–13. The magistrate judge did not find that Darin was a fugitive 
for purposes of invoking the fugitive disentitlement doctrine but denied the motion to dismiss. Id. 
at 10. The district court found that Darin was a fugitive for purposes of the doctrine, finding that 
all the purposes underlying the doctrine were present and thus supported disentitlement. Id. at 12. 
The court also explained why it would deny the motion to dismiss, if it were to reach the merits. 
Id. The Second Circuit dismissed Darin’s appeal and denied mandamus relief and subsequently 
denied panel and en banc reconsideration. Id. at 13. 
 113 Compare In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 414 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that Hijazi risks a serious 
enough threat of prosecution in the United States if he loses his challenge to the indictment suffi-
cient to satisfy any concerns of mutuality and that disentitlement is “too blunt an instrument” to 
punish a defendant for his absence so mandamus relief must be granted), with Appellate Order, 
supra note 12, at 2 (holding that Darin has not proven extraordinary circumstances that warrant 
mandamus relief). 
 114 See infra notes 118–163 and accompanying text. 
 115 See infra notes 118–130 and accompanying text. 
 116 See infra notes 131–144 and accompanying text. 
 117 See infra notes 145–163 and accompanying text. 
 118 United States v. Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Darin maintained that 
the complaint violated his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights because as “a foreign national 
[charged] with conspiring to manipulate a foreign financial benchmark, for a foreign currency, 
while working for a foreign bank, in a foreign country” a sufficient nexus did not exist between 
himself and the United States to support prosecution in the country. Id. (relying on Defendant’s 
Memorandum, supra note 111 at 1–2). He also argued that his prosecution under the circumstanc-
es contravened the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Id. 
 119 Id. at 414–15. The United States contended that Darin was a fugitive because he did not 
surrender himself in accordance with the arrest warrant. Id. at 417. The government also claimed 
that the four factors supporting application of the doctrine favored disentitlement in this case. Id. 
at 412–13. 
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the court from reviewing the merits of Darin’s motion to dismiss.120 The 
judge found that Darin was not a fugitive and even if he were, the rationales 
supporting application of the doctrine would not be applicable in this 
case.121 The district court judge concurrently reviewed the merits and ulti-
mately denied the motion to dismiss, finding that a sufficient nexus existed 
between Darin and the United States for purposes of due process.122 
Subsequently, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York determined that Darin was a fugitive and that the factors but-
tressing use of the doctrine were present in this case.123 The court deter-
mined that (1) a decision on Darin’s motion will not be enforceable against 
him as long as he remains in Switzerland, (2) that he is flouting the judicial 
process by remaining in Switzerland, (3) that similarly situated defendants 
would be encouraged to remain outside the United States, and (4) that his 
continued absence from the United States prejudices the government.124 
Additionally, the court noted that it would affirm the magistrate judge’s de-
nial of the motion to dismiss if it had, in the alternative, found that Darin 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Id. at 414–18 (detailing the magistrate judge’s reasoning for determining that Darin is not 
a fugitive and thus the fugitive disentitlement doctrine should not be applied). The magistrate 
judge relied on cases that limit the definition of “fugitive” to individuals who are present in the 
requisite jurisdiction at the time of the alleged offense. Id. at 415–16. He expressed apprehension 
that Darin was a fugitive under this definition because nothing in the record indicated that he had 
ever been to the United States or was attempting to conceal his location from U.S. authorities. Id. 
 121 Id. at 416–18. The magistrate judge found that a decision to endorse the complaint and 
maintain the arrest warrant was enforceable against Darin by virtue of the limitations they place 
on his ability to travel, employment prospects and personal interests. See id. at 416–17. The judge 
also found unpersuasive the government’s argument that Darin flouted the judicial process by 
refusing to appear in court because the refusal to appear in court “is the sine qua non of fugitive 
status.” Id. at 417. As a result, he found the government had not explained what actions constitute 
flouting of the judicial process and that absent any facts indicating this disrespect, the court could 
not conclude that Darin is culpable for doing so. Id. The judge also found the government’s argu-
ment that ruling on Darin’s motion to dismiss would encourage similarly situated defendants to 
flee the jurisdiction equally unpersuasive stating that again, the government put forward no facts 
to suggest that other defendants or potential defendants in LIBOR cases would be inspired by 
Darin’s conduct in the future. Id. Finally, the judge found that no prejudice would befall the gov-
ernment if the court ruled on the motion to dismiss. Id. 417–18. 
 122 United States v. Hayes (Hayes II), 118 F. Supp. 3d 620, 628–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12 
MAG 3229) (describing why a sufficient nexus exists between Darin and the United States, allowing 
him to be rightfully prosecuted in the United States). Judge Crotty explained that at this stage, a nex-
us inquiry is not necessary to determine whether Due Process has been provided but merely requires 
a review of “fundamental fairness of the criminal complaint.” Id. He also held that Darin’s argument 
that the allegations connecting him to the United States must be reviewed outside the purview of the 
allegations against his alleged co-conspirator, Hayes, was groundless. Id. at 629. 
 123 Hayes II, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 624–27. The court applied the constructive flight definition to 
the term fugitive, explaining that the court should not be “bound by the semantics that limit fugi-
tive status to fleeing or failing to return” when the defendant is a foreign national living abroad 
and whose alleged criminal conduct took place abroad. Id. at 626. 
 124 Id. at 626–27. 
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was not a fugitive.125 Darin filed a timely appeal to the Second Circuit in 
conjunction with a petition for mandamus relief.126 The Second Circuit dis-
missed the appeal and denied mandamus relief.127 Subsequently, the Second 
Circuit denied both panel and en banc reconsideration.128 In October 2016, 
Darin filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court.129 On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the petition.130 
B. In re Hijazi: A Strikingly Similar Case with an Opposite Outcome 
Ali Hijazi is a Lebanese citizen residing in Kuwait who was indicted in 
2005 on fraud-related charges in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of Illinois.131 The record indicates that Hijazi had only been 
                                                                                                                           
 125 Id. at 628–29. The court held that a nexus inquiry was not necessary at this stage and that 
at this time, Fifth Amendment protections merely required “fundamental fairness of the criminal 
complaint.” Id. at 628 (relying on United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
The complaint alleged that Darin conspired to manipulate LIBOR interest rates using United 
States wires, therefore prosecution in the United States would not be fundamentally unfair. Id. at 
628–29. Even under a sufficient nexus test, the acts of his alleged co-conspirator can be imparted 
on Darin, under general conspiracy principles, which would then satisfy the Fifth Amendment 
nexus requirement. Id. at 629. The reality is that today many crimes against the United States and 
American citizens happen outside of the country and the definition of fugitive should take into 
consideration the realities that go along with globalization. Id. The court also held that a ruling on 
the merits of Darin’s motion lacked mutuality, that Darin’s absence in the jurisdiction was suffi-
cient to conclude that he was flouting the judicial process, that ruling on the motion would en-
courage other similarly situated defendants to evade an arrest warrant, by remaining in their coun-
try while invoking protections of the Fifth Amendment and that the government would be preju-
diced by Darin’s refusal to submit to the jurisdiction. Id. at 8–10. 
 126 Petition, supra note 1, at 12. The United States filed a motion to have the appeal dismissed 
for lack of appellate jurisdiction, citing the collateral order doctrine. Id. Darin opposed the motion, 
saying the order was immediately appealable under the doctrine and conjointly filed his petition 
for mandamus. Id. at 12–13. The collateral order doctrine allows appellate courts to hear “appeals 
from interlocutory rulings . . . so long as those rulings conclusively decide an issue separate from 
the merits of the case and would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment.” Collateral 
Order Doctrine, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/collateral_order_doctrine 
[http://perma.cc/2WBZ-2AXB]. 
 127 Appellate Order, supra note 12, at 2. 
 128 United States v. Hayes at 1, No. 15-2597 (2d Cir. June 28, 2016). 
 129 Petition, supra note 1, at 35. 
 130 Proceedings and Orders in Darin v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, www.scotusblog.com/
case-files/cases/darin-v-united-states/ [http://perma.cc/D8NZ-DNEQ]. 
 131 In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 403 (7th Cir. 2009). In 2001, the U.S. Army contracted with 
Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) to provide goods and services to military locations worldwide, 
including in Kuwait. Id. at 404. KBR was in charge of soliciting bids for military services, includ-
ing those needed at the Kuwaiti airport. Id. Jeff Mazon, the procurement manager stationed in 
Kuwait, was responsible for hiring subcontractors to perform under KBR’s contract. Id. Hijazi, on 
behalf of his company, was the winning bidder for the contract. Id. After only two bidders replied, 
one being Hijazi on behalf of his company, Mazon increased prices more than three-fold and 
awarded the contract to Hijazi’s company, LaNouvelle General Trading & Contracting Co. Id. The 
government contended that Mazon did this with the understanding that Hijazi would “reward” him 
for his efforts and a subcontract was executed in Kuwait. Id. Mazon sent emails regarding the 
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to the United States once, for a brief visit on an unrelated purpose in 
1993.132 The United States did not (and currently does not) have an extradi-
tion treaty with Kuwait and the Kuwaiti government informed the United 
States that it had no intention of voluntarily turning over Hijazi to American 
authorities.133 After the first indictment, Hijazi filed a motion to dismiss, 
citing inappropriate extraterritorial application of U.S. law.134 A magistrate 
judge denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that Hijazi was a fugitive 
for purposes of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and thus was not entitled 
to have his motion considered.135 The district court, on de novo review, was 
not as convinced of Hijazi’s fugitive status nor that the doctrine barred the 
court from hearing his motion.136 The court decided not to enter a judgment 
on Hijazi’s motion to dismiss until he was arraigned.137 Hijazi subsequently 
filed a second motion to dismiss, which was also held in abeyance, and in 
August 2008 he filed a writ of mandamus in the Seventh Circuit.138 
Notwithstanding that both defendants were foreign nationals whose al-
leged conduct occurred outside the United States and who were not other-
wise subject to U.S. jurisdiction, the two circuits reached opposite conclu-
sions regarding the respective petitioners’ fugitive status under the fugitive 
disentitlement doctrine.139 The Seventh Circuit in Hijazi declined to impose 
                                                                                                                           
subcontract managers (who were located in the United States) between March to August 2003, 
and LaNouvelle submitted allegedly inflated invoices to KBR, who paid them and then billed the 
United States for reimbursement. Id. The U.S. Army complied with the reimbursements using 
checks and wire transfers. Id. In September 2003, Hijazi paid Mazon $1 million and signed a 
promissory note, in order to mask the “reward” payment as a loan. Id. Hijazi then sent an email to 
Mazon, whose email account was based in the United States, stating the entire sum was his money 
alone. Id. Mazon was in Greece at the time he opened the email but when he returned to the Unit-
ed States he unsuccessfully attempted to open a bank account in order to deposit the $1 million. 
Id. Hijazi emailed Mazon again, to an allegedly U.S. based email account, with instructions on 
how to successfully deposit the money. Id. Hijazi sent a third email to Mazon cautioning him to be 
conscientious of what he said to “ex-friends in Kuwait” and the government alleged that Mazon 
was back in the United States when he received this third email. Id. Both Mazon and Hijazi were 
indicted in the Central District of Illinois. Id. All of the alleged criminal conduct occurred in Ku-
wait and not the United States. Id. 
 132 Id. at 412. 
 133 Id. at 403. 
 134 Id. at 405. 
 135 Id. The judge cited to the doctrine announced in Molinaro v. New Jersey and expressed pri-
mary concern over the issue of mutuality. 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970); Hijazi, 589 F.3d at 405. 
 136 Hijazi, 589 F.3d at 406. The court noted that “Hijazi has never been convicted of a crime, 
Hijazi has never been physically present within the jurisdiction of this Court, and he has submitted 
to Kuwaiti authorities.” Id. Yet the court considered the same mutuality concern announced by the 
magistrate judge. Id. 
 137 Id. The court noted that Hijazi would be entitled to a ruling on the merits of his motion if 
and when he decided to appear in the jurisdiction. Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Appellate Order, supra note 12, at 1–2; In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 411 (7th Cir. 2009). 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine 
2018] Doctrine on the Run: The Circuit Split on Fugitive Disentitlement 1175 
fugitive status and thus had no need to apply the fugitive disentitlement doc-
trine.140 Relying on the fact that Hijazi did not actually flee the jurisdiction, 
the court abstained from entertaining the “constructive flight” definition of 
“flee” and found that mutuality was not a concern.141 In contrast, the Second 
Circuit in Darin found mutuality to be of concern, that Darin was flouting the 
judicial process and that ruling on Darin’s motion would embolden similar 
defendants to remain outside of the United States.142 Differing interpretations 
of the mutuality concern appear to be driving the factor dividing the two cir-
cuits.143 When the circuit courts issue decisions in two cases that are so fac-
tually similar, such as Hijazi and Darin, the Supreme Court should resolve 
the conflict and establish a single standard, thereby promoting predictability 
of outcomes in future cases.144 
                                                                                                                           
did not apply to Hijazi because he is not a fugitive for purposes of invoking the doctrine. Hijazi, 
589 F.3d at 411. The court also found that mutuality was not lacking, another reason to disfavor 
invocation of the doctrine. Id. at 413. The Second Circuit granted the government’s motion to 
dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction and denied Darin mandamus relief. Appellate Order, 
supra note 12, at 1–2. In so doing, the court affirmed the district court’s finding that Darin was a 
fugitive and that he is not able to challenge the complaint until he submits to the court’s jurisdic-
tion. United States v. Hayes (Hayes II), 118 F. Supp. 3d 620, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12 MAG 
3229). 
 140 Hijazi, 589 F.3d at 412. The court determined that, excepting the brief visit to the United 
States once, sixteen years prior the filing of the complaint, Hijazi had never been in the United 
States, never been in Illinois and did not own any property in the United States. Id. In light of 
these facts, it would be improper to say that Hijazi had fled the jurisdiction or fled from restraints 
placed upon him. Id. As a result, the doctrine did not “directly” apply to him. Id. 
 141 See id. at 412–13 (detailing Hijazi’s past presence in the United States, which amounted to 
a brief visit sixteen years ago on unrelated affairs, which clearly demonstrate he did not flee from 
the jurisdiction nor was he attempting to evade any restraints placed on him). As a result, he is not 
a fugitive and the doctrine was not an appropriate mechanism to rely on in refraining from hearing 
his motion. Id. The Seventh Circuit found that mutuality was not a concern because, unlike the 
district court, they took into consideration the real-life consequences that would befall Hijazi if he 
were to lose on his motion to dismiss. Id. 
 142 Hayes II, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 626–27. 
 143 See Hijazi, 589 F.3d at 413 (finding that Hijazi’s motion did not lack mutuality because he 
would suffer various consequences if he were to lose on his motion to dismiss); Hayes II, 118 F. 
Supp. 3d at 626 (declaring that Darin’s motion to dismiss lacks mutuality because there is no 
mechanism for the court to enforce an adverse judgment against him until he submits to U.S. ju-
risdiction). The Seventh Circuit viewed mutuality concerns in a broader context than did the Sec-
ond Circuit. Hijazi, 589 F.3d at 413 (stating that the district court did not fully appreciate the ex-
tent of the consequences that would befall Hijazi if he lost on his motion to dismiss). Just because 
Hijazi would be able to remain in Kuwait where the decision to deny his motion to dismiss would 
seem to have no practical effect does not negate the real-life effects of having criminal charges 
pending in a foreign country. See id. In adopting the district court order, the Second Circuit be-
lieved that the burdens imposed by disentitlement, such as restricted ability to travel, tarnished 
reputation and difficulty in obtaining/retaining employment, are common to all fugitives and can-
not be seen to outweigh the benefits bestowed on the defendant by being able to remain free in 
Switzerland. Hayes II, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 626–27. 
 144 See Golden, supra note 98 (noting that application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine 
involves an issue of integral fairness to both foreign defendants and the U.S. government and 
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C. Does a Narrow or Broad Interpretation of Mutuality Better Serve the 
Purposes of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine? 
Although several rationales underlie the fugitive disentitlement doc-
trine, mutuality of enforcement is the pivotal concern when a defendant le-
gally remains outside of U.S. jurisdiction.145 Mutuality refers to the ability 
of a court’s pronouncement to be effective on a party.146 For purposes of the 
doctrine, mutuality favors disentitlement when a favorable outcome benefits 
the defendant and an unfavorable decision will not affect the defendant.147 
The Second Circuit in Darin considered a comparatively narrow set of con-
sequences that would befall Darin if his motion were not reviewed, in con-
trast to those assessed by the Seventh Circuit in Hijazi.148 The Seventh Cir-
cuit’s broader analysis of mutuality in Hijazi is a better interpretation of the 
doctrine’s essential purposes and thus is the correct standard because it ac-
counts for the real life consequences for a foreign defendant who has pend-
ing criminal charges in the United States.149 
                                                                                                                           
therefore warrants Supreme Court review). The doctrine is one of equity, i.e. one foreign defend-
ant should not be treated differently than another foreign defendant based solely on which court 
they are charged in. Id. 
 145 See Enforcement of Judgments, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/
en/legal-considerations/judicial/enforcement-of-judgments.html [http://perma.cc/EH45-UNH6] 
(explaining how enforcement of foreign judgments works). Because recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments is largely governed by local domestic law of a country, a defendant who is 
not present in the country where he has been charged or convicted is unlikely to be directly con-
strained by the consequences of the charge or conviction. Id.; see, e.g., Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125. 
U.S. 692, 692 (1887) (refusing to rule on defendant’s motion because he was not in custody and 
therefore not bound by any pronouncement); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (focus-
ing on the importance of enforceability in deciding whether to rule on defendant’s motion). The 
Supreme Court has continuously relied on the enforceability rationale when choosing to invoke 
the doctrine. See Stolley, supra note 39, at 754. 
 146 See supra note 145 and accompanying text (defining mutuality). 
 147 United States v. Hayes (Hayes II), 118 F. Supp. 3d 620, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12 
MAG 3229). 
 148 See In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 413 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that the district court reviewed 
the mutuality concern too narrowly and as a result, granted mandamus relief); Petition, supra note 
1, at 31 (stating that the Second Circuit’s interpretation and application of the fugitive disentitle-
ment doctrine is in conflict with Supreme Court precedent on the issue). Counsel explained that 
the Second Circuit’s decision to ignore the practical effects of disentitlement and only review the 
legal and procedural effects on Darin does not further the goal of enforceability. Petition, supra 
note 1, at 31. Additionally, Darin is not defying any legal order by remaining in Switzerland and 
thus cannot be said to be flouting the juridical process. Id. As noted in Degen and Ortega-
Rodriguez, disentitling Darin would not serve any remaining rationales underlying the doctrine. 
Id.; see Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 824–25 (1996), superseded on other grounds by 
statute, Civil Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 983, 985 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2466–2467); Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 
U.S. 234, 239–42 (1993). 
 149 See Hijazi, 589 F.3d at 413 (listing the real-life consequences Hijazi would face whether 
his motion was denied or held in abeyance until he appeared in the United States). The Seventh 
Circuit critiqued the district court’s overly narrow conception of mutuality when it explained that 
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The Second Circuit’s pronouncement that reviewing Darin’s motion 
will either secure him a dismissal or bind him to an unenforceable judgment 
with no real-life ramifications is overly simplistic because it ignores the 
realities of being charged with a crime.150 When the prosecuting party is 
concerned with punishing an individual for violating the law, binding the 
defendant to an adverse judgment is not the only way in which punishment 
is accomplished.151 Alternative punishments traditionally include a prison 
sentence, restitution or probation.152 If the court were to deny Darin’s mo-
tion to dismiss, it would restrict his ability to travel and his ability to main-
tain employment, among other repercussions.153 Additionally, Switzerland 
could at any time decide to cooperate with the U.S. government and volun-
tarily extradite him, forcing him to confront the charges.154 These are not 
                                                                                                                           
Hijazi had little to lose from an adverse ruling on the merits of his motion. Id. Beyond disagreeing 
with the district court’s limited concept of what constitutes mutuality, the Seventh Circuit relied 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Degen, which held that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine 
may not be applied on the sole basis of “a perceived lack of mutuality.” Id. at 414; see Petition, 
supra note 1, at 33 (describing that the Seventh Circuit’s approach to the fugitive disentitlement 
doctrine in this context is better because it does not reach beyond its means and uses the doctrine 
properly, unlike the Second Circuit). 
 150 See Petition, supra note 1, at 31–33. Counsel relied on the similar factual scenarios be-
tween Darin’s situation and Hijazi and explained that the similar constraints placed on Hijazi, 
prior to the granting of mandamus relief, of pending criminal charges in the United States would 
constrain Darin in the same manner. Id. 
 151 See id. (espousing that real-life consequences, such as inability to travel, loss of job, freez-
ing of bank accounts, are punishments that Darin would bear until he submitted to U.S. jurisdic-
tion to obtain a determinative ruling on his motion to dismiss). By choosing not to rule on the 
merits of Darin’s motion to dismiss, Darin cannot possibly be bound by an adverse judgment but 
he is nonetheless punished by the reality of being tied to pending criminal charges in the United 
States. Id. Although this is likely not what the government had in mind in terms of punishing Da-
rin’s alleged extraterritorial criminal conduct, to say his situation does not amount to a punishment 
ignores the reality. Id. 
 152 Dennis Massino, Forms of Punishment in the Criminal Justice System, LEGAL BEAGLE, 
https://legalbeagle.com/8400916-forms-punishment-criminal-justice-system.html [http://perma.cc/
34A7-TLRS]. 
 153 See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text. See generally Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401 (list-
ing various consequences that are likely to affect a foreign defendant if he does not travel to the 
United States to answer charges against him); Petition, supra note 1, at 30–34 (detailing the results 
of applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to defendants similarly situated to Darin); Golden, 
supra note 98; Shaffer, supra note 100. 
 154 MICHAEL J. GARCIA & CHRIS DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-958, EXTRADITION TO 
AND FROM THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND RECENT TREATIES 41 (2010). The 
United States has had an extradition treaty with Switzerland since September 10, 1997. Id. Despite 
the existence of an extradition treaty, a country has a right to refuse to extradite its own nationals, 
which is probably the single largest impediment in extradition proceedings. Id. at 13. Switzerland 
has also been known to refuse U.S. extradition requests in the past. Nick Giambruno, The Best 
Countries for Your Escape Plan, INT’L MAN http://www.internationalman.com/articles/which-
countries-can-the-nsa-whistleblower-escape-to [http://perma.cc/K983-5JGP]. Despite Switzer-
land’s history of declining to extradite nationals to the United States, it can choose at any time to 
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insignificant burdens; they are real life consequences that Darin would have 
to bear indefinitely.155 The Second Circuit, unlike the Seventh Circuit, how-
ever, has chosen to restrict itself to viewing mutuality only in terms of legal-
ly binding the defendant to a final judgment on the merits.156 
In restricting its view of mutuality in this way, the Second Circuit is 
not furthering the underlying goals of labeling a defendant a fugitive for 
purposes of disentitling him of his rights to use the judicial system.157 Ra-
ther, this view uses the doctrine as way of forcing an outcome that it desires, 
namely to get Darin to submit to U.S. jurisdiction.158 If the court had con-
sidered other goals of the doctrine, such as discouragement of flight or en-
                                                                                                                           
turn over Darin to U.S. authorities and he has no idea of when this could happen to him and at that 
point he has no choice to but to submit to U.S. jurisdiction. See id. 
 155 See Kingsley Napley, Interpol Red Notices and How to Deal with Them, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 7, 
2013) www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1279d646-9189-40b0-817a-25ae9a4e873a [http://
perma.cc/PLP6-N6UJ]. Not only would international travel become extremely risky for Darin and 
his personal and professional reputations be tarnished but banks may force Darin to close his ac-
count(s) with them because they may be concerned about complying with Anti-Money Laundering 
obligations. Id. Darin will also risk that the Swiss government will open its own criminal investi-
gation into him, separate from the one initiated in the United States. Id. 
 156 Compare United States v. Hayes (Hayes II), 118 F. Supp. 3d 620, 626–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(No. 12 MAG 3229) (explaining why disentitling Darin supports the rationales behind the doc-
trine), with In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 413 (7th Cir. 2009) (detailing why disentitling Hijazi would 
not serve the purposes of the doctrine). 
 157 Petition, supra note 1, at 33; cf. Hayes II, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 626–27. The court only exam-
ined how Darin would be affected by any order entered against him and noted that he will “con-
tinue to ignore any order made by this court by simply remaining in Switzerland, his home coun-
try.” Hayes II, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 626. The court further noted that an adverse judgment will force 
him to choose between two undesirable situations, continue to live in Switzerland with the re-
straints imposed by criminal charges in the United States or submit to extradition. Id. at 627. In 
essence, Darin’s choice is to either continue to elude U.S. authorities or comply with an arrest 
warrant, and because Darin is unlikely to comply with an unfavorable disposition, there is no 
mutuality. Id. The decision to disentitle Darin under the doctrine is not appropriate because it does 
not support the other rationales for applying the doctrine such as promoting self-surrender, dis-
couraging prison escapes, and supporting the efficient operation of appellate courts. See supra 
notes 56–73 and accompanying text (outlining various rationales underpinning the doctrine). By 
carving out one definition of mutuality and saying that is the only one that matters ignores reality. 
See Petition, supra note 1, at 31–33 (describing why ascribing to only one narrow definition of 
mutuality does not take into consideration real life). 
 158 See Petition, supra note 1, at 14–15 (stating how the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the 
collateral order doctrine and the fugitive disentitlement doctrine allowed the court to find that 
Darin was a fugitive and thus did not have to review the merits of his motion to dismiss). Darin’s 
constitutional argument is that he should not have to appear in the United States and stand trial 
because there isn’t a sufficient nexus between himself and the United States. Id. The problem, 
however, is that the Second Circuit’s application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine maintains 
that Darin cannot assert that defense without entering the United States and submitting himself to 
its jurisdiction. Id. The Second Circuit’s application of both doctrines was done with one goal in 
mind yet the application is incongruous with prior Supreme Court rulings and cannot stand. See id. 
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couragement of self-surrender, it is abundantly evident that declaring Darin 
a fugitive for purposes of disentitling him would not further these goals.159 
The Second Circuit’s decision creates a “constitutional vacuum” for sim-
ilarly situated defendants.160 It essentially renders the prosecution of a foreign 
citizen for any alleged criminal conduct that occurs outside the United States 
immune from review unless the foreign citizen voluntarily submits himself to 
U.S. jurisdiction.161 Such individuals, automatically deemed fugitives, are 
unlikely to travel to the United States, thus leaving unresolved the underlying 
issue of the reach of extraterritorial application of U.S. law.162 If the United 
States wants Darin, and similar defendants, to appear in its courts and ensure 
that he be bound by any adverse judgment, the fugitive disentitlement doc-
trine, as it stands, is not the appropriate vehicle for achieving that goal.163 
III. FOREIGN DEFENDANTS WHO REFUSE TO APPEAR IN THE UNITED 
STATES SHOULD NOT AUTOMATICALLY BE LABELED FUGITIVES  
AND DISENTITLED OF THEIR RIGHTS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Darin created a circuit split on the 
appropriate application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to foreign 
defendants.164 In October 2016, Darin filed a petition of certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court and on March 6, 2017 the Supreme Court de-
nied the petition without comment.165 This Part argues that the Supreme 
Court should have granted certiorari in order to establish a uniform applica-
tion of the doctrine so as to guarantee non-disparate treatment of similarly 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See Hijazi, 589 F.3d at 403 (explaining that the doctrine did not exactly apply to Hijazi 
because he had yet to be convicted of a crime and had never been physically present within the 
court’s jurisdiction). The Seventh Circuit declined to determine that Hijazi was a fugitive and thus 
disentitling him would not serve the purposes of discouraging escape and promoting self-
surrender. See id. Additionally, Hijazi was not about the dismissal of an appeal but about demand-
ing review of the merits of a motion, and disentitling him would not serve the purpose of promot-
ing efficacious operation of the appellate process. See id. Darin is in the exact same situation. See 
Petition, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 160 See Petition, supra note 1, at 33. 
 161 Id. at 33–34. 
 162 See id. at 33 (relying on Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 
102, 115 (1997), for the notion that a careful inquiry must be conducted when extending applica-
tion of U.S. law and asserting U.S. jurisdiction in the international field); infra notes 184–193 and 
accompanying text (explaining the importance of testing the boundaries of U.S. law on the inter-
national stage and how the Seventh Circuit’s, and not the Second Circuit’s, construction of the 
fugitive disentitlement doctrine will allow this). 
 163 See Petition, supra note 1, at 31 (stating that the Second Circuit’s application of the fugi-
tive disentitlement doctrine is not in conformance with the Supreme Court’s prior decisions and 
thus is not an available tool to force Darin to appear in the United States). 
 164 See supra note 139 and accompanying text (comparing the Second and Seventh Circuit’s 
application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine). 
 165 See Darin v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1223 (2017) (mem.) (denying petition for certiorari). 
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situated defendants.166 Section A explains the unfair and factional treatment 
that foreign defendants will continue to receive as a result of the ongoing 
circuit split.167 Section B argues that the Seventh Circuit’s position should 
be chosen as the standard, as this will serve the purposes of the doctrine and 
allow the outer limits of extraterritorial application of U.S. law to become 
more defined.168 
A. Inconsistent Treatment for Similarly Situated Defendants Based Solely 
on Prosecuting Jurisdiction Is Fundamentally Unfair 
Similarly situated foreign defendants should not be treated differently 
based only on the fact that they are charged in different U.S. jurisdictions.169 
Hijazi and Darin represent two defendants in that exact situation: both were 
foreign nationals charged in the United States for alleged criminal conduct 
that took place outside the United States yet their cases had opposite out-
comes for no discerning reason.170 Factually similar cases with contradicto-
ry outcomes are precisely the cases that the Supreme Court should be hear-
ing.171 Denying certiorari was a missed opportunity for the Supreme Court 
to rectify this discordant treatment, however the Court cannot avoid con-
                                                                                                                           
 166 See infra notes 169–193 and accompanying text. 
 167 See infra notes 169–183 and accompanying text. 
 168 See infra notes 184–193 and accompanying text. 
 169 See Kiran H. Griffith, Fugitives in Immigration: A Call for Legislative Guidelines on Dis-
entitlement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 209, 212 (2012) (explaining that issues arise in immigration 
cases when a petitioner may be a fugitive in one jurisdiction and not another for purposes of the 
fugitive disentitlement doctrine). The circuit courts are divided on whether an alien is considered a 
fugitive for failing to appear for a DHS hearing but is otherwise in the jurisdiction. Id. at 211. This 
individual is not a fugitive in the Ninth Circuit, will probably not be a fugitive in the Second Cir-
cuit but probably will be a fugitive in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. Id. at 212. This split creates 
inequality and reinforces unpredictability in application of the doctrine to this class of petitioners. 
Id. 
 170 See supra notes 111–138 and accompanying text (comparing the factual similarities be-
tween Hijazi and Darin). 
 171 See Evan Bernick, The Circuit Splits Are out There—and the Court Should Resolve Them, 
16 ENGAGE 36, 36 (2015) (detailing factors that influence the Supreme Court’s decision to grant 
certiorari). In a talk given by Chief Justice John Roberts at the District of Columbia judicial con-
ference, he underscored the fact that circuit splits are by far the most compelling factor in deciding 
whether to grant certiorari. Id. Supreme Court Rule 10 instructs the justices to consider, in decid-
ing whether to grant certiorari, whether a federal circuit court has entered a decision that is in 
conflict with another circuit court’s decision on an important federal question. SUP. CT. R. 10. The 
Supreme Court is under no obligation to review writs of certiorari but often chooses to hear cases 
based on whether a ruling might reconcile conflicting positions on an issue between the federal 
circuit courts. Supreme Court Procedures, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.
gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/
supreme-1 [http://perma.cc/G798-6PCU]. 
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fronting the issue for long because the nature of globalization means it will 
reappear sooner rather than later.172 
The deepening circuit split on appropriate application of the doctrine is 
a cause for concern.173 Similar, if not identical, criminal conduct will con-
tinue to be treated differently based solely on the jurisdiction that decides to 
prosecute the conduct.174 Both sides to the dispute will continue to confront 
issues of fundamental fairness.175 Until the Supreme Court chooses to hear a 
case on this issue, similarly situated foreign defendants who are prosecuted 
in jurisdictions overseen by the Second Circuit will continue to receive less 
favorable and misguided treatment than counterparts prosecuted in the ju-
risdictions controlled by the Seventh Circuit.176 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See Lisa Savitt & Melissa Pierre, Personal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Defendant, 
GPSOLO MAG., Sept. 2006, at 36, 36–37 (stating how globalization has forced a departure from 
standard rules that regulate personal jurisdiction in the United States). Advances in technology and 
a growing global economy have forced a broadening of traditional jurisdictional rules to hail for-
eign defendants into court in the United States. Id. How these rules actually work is important 
because foreign defendants increasingly use the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction to avoid 
the burden of traveling to and litigating an expensive case in the United States. Id. 
 173 See Petition, supra note 1, at 34 (explaining that if the Second Circuit’s application of the 
doctrine continues to be deemed valid, Fifth Amendment protections will continue to be undercut); 
Jeanine Kerridge, Is a Non-United States Citizen Who Refuses to Leave His Home Country to Face 
FCPA Charges a Fugitive from Justice?, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 30, 2014) http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=29f7045d-f161-4534-a7c2-806be9ec0426 [http://perma.cc/CBC9-AKC2] 
(outlining the facts of In re Han Yong Kim and the Ninth Circuit’s decision to label him a fugi-
tive). As part of his petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, the defendant pointed to the U.S. 
government’s increased extraterritorial prosecution of civil and criminal cases to highlight the fact 
that the issue will continue to appear and thus the Court should hear his case and take the oppor-
tunity to resolve the circuit split. See Petition, supra note 1, at 33–34. 
 174 See generally Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the 
Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137 (2012) (examining the unequal rights given to indi-
viduals because of circuit splits, through the lens of Fourth Amendment rights). As a result of the 
Supreme Court declining to hear numerous cases concerning the Fourth Amendment, the rights of 
citizens and the scope of law enforcement’s authority vary across jurisdictions resulting in dispar-
ate rights for citizens of the same country. Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: 
Reducing Intercircuit Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 
70 TENN. L. REV. 605, 621 (2003) (arguing why federal circuit splits need to be resolved); Logan, 
supra, at 1140. Professor Daniel Meador understands the rationales behind allowing constitutional 
questions to percolate in the circuit courts but does not find this rationale has any merit when it 
comes to interpretation of statutes. Algero, supra, at 621. Statutory law should have a precise 
definition so that all litigants in federal court are subject to the same law, thereby being treated 
equally. Id. 
 175 Golden, supra note 98. Not only does the doctrine affect both parties in cases involving 
prosecution of foreign defendants, but the application of the doctrine has realistic consequences 
for both parties and determining the appropriate application is crucial. See id. 
 176 Compare In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 414 (7th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the rationales 
behind the fugitive disentitlement doctrine do not support disentitlement based on the facts), with 
United States v. Hayes (Hayes II), 118 F. Supp. 3d 620, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12 MAG 3229) 
(imposing fugitive status on Darin and finding that the motives supporting the fugitive disentitle-
ment doctrine support disentitlement based on the facts). 
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The Southern District of New York has jurisdiction over major finan-
cial centers with a home base in New York, specifically in Manhattan, mak-
ing it the venue for disposition of a significant number of cases pertaining 
to international business matters.177 As international business continues to 
expand, the Southern District of New York will likely prosecute increasing 
numbers of financial and other white-collar crimes involving foreign de-
fendants.178 It is thus reasonable to posit that cases where the fugitive disen-
titlement doctrine is invoked will also increase.179 The Supreme Court’s 
decision to deny certiorari in Darin, was a missed opportunity to enunciate 
a clear standard and it is reasonable to assume that the number of indefinite 
pending cases in that district will accumulate rapidly as a result.180 
                                                                                                                           
 177 See United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_District_Court_for_the_Southern_District_of_New_York 
[http://perma.cc/PC6A-2RCH] (stating that appeals from decisions in the Southern District are 
heard by the Second Circuit). Decisions from the Southern District of New York, and by extension 
appeals from the Second Circuit, are very persuasive because of the courts’ jurisdiction over a large 
number of prominent financial businesses. Id.; see, e.g., Second Circuit Docket List, BLOOMBERG L., 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/search/results/2cfc5e40cb02799966115867ab441
eab (listing 325 anti-trust cases currently pending in the Second Circuit). This docket list is only 
one of several representing the high volume of ongoing business litigation in the Second Circuit. 
Id. 
 178 See Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 524 
(2015) (relying on a statement from a Commerce Department official about the United States’ 
heightened concern with combatting increased corruption in global business transactions); Editori-
al Board, United States v. Yeh Illustrates the Challenges in International Trade Secrets Cases, 
TRADE SECRETS WATCH (Apr. 10, 2014) https://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2014/04/
10/u-s-v-yeh-illustrates-the-challenges-in-international-trade-secrets-cases/ [ http://perma.cc/JPS6-
L6BD] (explaining that the trial of Ellen Yeh involves a number of important issues relevant to an 
“increasingly global knowledge economy”); Kirby Behre et al., DOJ Is Losing the Battle to Pros-
ecute Foreign Executives, LAW360 (Mar. 3, 2015) https://www.law360.com/articles/626482/doj-
is-losing-the-battle-to-prosecute-foreign-executives [https://perma.cc/BD5X-5UZL] (stating that 
increases in global white-collar investigations has resulted in a growing number of individual 
defendants who are not located in the United States); Marshall L. Miller, Principal Deputy Assis-
tant Att’y Gen., Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Global Investigation Review 
Program (Sept. 17, 2014) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-principal-deputy-assistant-
attorney-general-criminal-division-marshall-l-miller [https://perma.cc/45SJ-FF9P] (stating that 
prosecuting individuals for white-collar crimes is a top priority for the DOJ’s criminal division). 
 179 See Peter H. Acker, A Critique of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine and Why It Should 
Not Apply in Certain Immigration Proceedings, IMMIGRATION LAW OFFICES OF P.H. ACKER & 
ASSOCS., LLC (stating that the doctrine has become an important strategic tool that has been in-
voked with increased frequency in order to get cases dismissed at the federal appellate level). 
 180 See Behre et al., supra note 178 (explaining how white-collar investigations charging 
companies are significantly more successful than when individual defendants are charged). For-
eign individuals are significantly less likely to plead guilty to FCPA charges than companies. See 
id. As a result, it is harder to secure convictions against them. Id. Those individuals who choose 
not to plead guilty remain in their home nation, while hundreds of similar charges against other 
foreign defendants remain pending and backlog the U.S. court system. Id.; see also infra note 181 
and accompanying text (explaining the consequences from the lack of a national standard in appli-
cation of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to foreign defendants). 
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In establishing a standard for the application of the fugitive disentitle-
ment doctrine to foreign defendants, the Supreme Court would enhance 
predictability in these types of cases.181 A clear standard will address the 
legitimate concerns of both parties to the dispute and should reduce, if not 
eliminate, unnecessary delay due to disagreement over the peculiar treat-
ment of foreign defendants and their judicial rights.182 With these prelimi-
nary disagreements no longer an issue, the courts will be able to move on to 
the merits of the case, where their attention should be focused.183 
B. Adoption of the Seventh Circuit Standard Will Permit the United States 
to Test the Outer Limits of Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law 
Resolving the fugitive disentitlement doctrine split is important in its 
own right, but it may also help refine the limits of applying U.S. law extra-
territorially.184 At their core, the cases of Darin and Hijazi were not about 
fugitives and their judicial rights but about prosecuting foreign nationals 
                                                                                                                           
 181 See Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability and Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (1999) (explaining how federal appellate courts have rendered an in-
creasing number of decisions, many of which conflict, without continued Supreme Court supervi-
sion). When the Supreme Court chooses not to hear cases where the circuits are split, leaving in 
place judge made law, the outcomes of cases are less predictable and “quirky.” Id. Thus, a Su-
preme Court decision on whether the Second or Seventh Circuit’s application of the fugitive dis-
entitlement doctrine is the national standard would serve as a control over judge-made law and 
enhance predictability in cases. See id. 
 182 See Colin W. Maguire, The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, WMU-COOLEY L. REV. 4 (2012) 
https://works.bepress.com/colin_maguire/7/ [https://perma.cc/W4SN-SHM3] (describing why it is 
imperative that either Congress or the Supreme Court provide clarity as to who qualifies as a fugi-
tive under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine). The term fugitive could be restricted to its com-
mon law application, which encompasses only someone who has committed a crime in a jurisdic-
tion and subsequently flees and hides himself, or it could be interpreted expansively to where it 
would include a foreign alien who has never been in the United States. See id. The current issue is 
that the Supreme Court, in deciding to repeatedly deny petitions of certiorari on the matter, has left 
unregulated the appellate courts’ discretionary authority under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine 
and left unresolved important preliminary issues affecting both sides to a case. See id. at 6–7. 
 183 See generally Nathan Capone, Trial of Serious Harm by Preliminary Issue Not Appropri-
ate in All Cases, FIELDFISHER: DEFAMATION L. BLOG (Jan. 15, 2016, 5:09 PM) [perma.cc/7Y5K-
3AUU] (explaining how the courts would become even more backlogged if every defamation case 
was subject to a preliminary issue trial on the definition of “serious harm”). Preliminary hearings 
on non-core issues increase delay and costs of litigation. See id. 
 184 Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due 
Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1222 (1992) (explaining that the application of American federal 
statutes is not merely an academic problem but an issue that raises serious practical concerns). Extra-
territorial application of U.S. law has been a dominant tool in furthering American policy goals over-
seas. Id. If courts are not able to so liberally invoke the fugitive disentitlement doctrine against for-
eign defendants, more defendants will be able to present defenses against alleged violations of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or RICO violations. Golden, supra note 98. By allowing foreign de-
fendants to contest U.S. criminal charges, while residing outside the United States, the limits of extra-
territorial reach of U.S. federal statutes will become apparent/will continue to evolve. See id. 
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under U.S. law for conduct that occurred outside of the United States.185 
Once the fugitive controversy is resolved, the courts can then turn their at-
tention to the various substantive questions presented by the cases.186 
Extraterritorial application of U.S. law is foremost a question of legis-
lative intent.187 There is a presumption that U.S. federal law applies only 
within the country and that courts will interpret and apply congressional 
statutes in a fashion that does not impinge on international law.188 In some 
cases, Congress has explicitly stated that certain statutes apply outside of 
the United States, evidencing clear congressional intent.189 In other situa-
tions, courts have found implied congressional intent for certain federal 
criminal statutes to operate overseas.190 The congressional intent must then 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 403 (7th Cir. 2009) (charging Ali Hijazi with violation of 
the major fraud statute under 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a) (2012) and violation of the wire fraud statute 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1343); Complaint, supra note 2, at 1 (charging Roger Darin with conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349). 
 186 See Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 409 
(2010) (stating Roscoe Pound’s dissatisfaction with the need to decide procedural technicalities 
before reaching the true merits of the case). In order to resolve a case on the merits, it is necessary 
to decide the procedural barriers that preclude a court from moving forward and deciding the sub-
stantive issues of law in a case. Id. 
 187 See Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and 
Constitutional Appraisal, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 14 (1987) (explaining that the American 
court system operates under the obligation to promote conduct in conformance with legislative man-
dates, whether such mandates may conflict with another nation’s laws or international law); CHRIS 
DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMI-
NAL LAW (Summary) (2016) (stating that application of American criminal law outside of the United 
States is first and foremost a question of express or implied legislative intent). 
 188 Cafarelli, supra note 89, at 257. If Congress’s intent on the extraterritorial reach of a stat-
ute is unclear, U.S. courts will construe the statute in a manner that is least likely to result in un-
reasonable intervention in a sovereign country’s affairs. Id. 
 189 Doyle, supra note 187, at 9. Many federal criminal statutes enjoy express extraterritorial 
application, such as 18 U.S.C. § 115 (violence against federal officials, former officials and mem-
bers of their families), 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (murder), 18 U.S.C. § 1460 (sale or possession with in-
tent to sell obscene material), and 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (prohibited monetary transactions from specif-
ic unlawful activity). Id. at 42–43. These statutes have been expressly granted extraterritorial ap-
plication mainly in the context when the conduct occurs “within the special maritime and territori-
al jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at 15. 
 190 Id. at 19. District courts have interpreted the holdings in United States v. Bowman, 260 
U.S. 94 (1922) (announcing that the nature and purpose of a statute indicate whether Congress 
intended it to apply outside the United States) and Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 623 (1927) 
(stating that an individual, who is outside of the United States, who partakes in conduct that af-
fects interests in the United States will be held liable in the United States) to mean a large number 
of federal criminal statutes are binding on individuals outside of the United States via Congress’s 
implied intent. Id. The Court in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. The European Community endorsed implied 
congressional intent to extend extraterritorial application of “piggyback” statutes—conspiracy, 
attempting, aiding and abetting—whose application is based on a separate crime. 136 S.Ct. 2090, 
2102 (2016); Doyle, supra note 187, at 20. 
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be considered in light of best practices in foreign relations.191 If courts are 
not allowed to automatically invoke the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in 
cases involving extraterritorial application of U.S. law, foreign defendants 
will be allowed to test the U.S. government’s ability to bring criminal 
charges for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, antitrust laws, 
and securities laws, among others.192 This will create a more developed and 
practical body of legal precedent for these types of cases.193 
CONCLUSION 
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine is aimed at preventing criminals 
who have escaped imprisonment or fled the jurisdiction from reaping the 
benefits of the judicial process. The doctrine was not meant to be a means to 
force foreign defendants who have never been to the United States to travel 
to the jurisdiction if they want to challenge the criminal complaint filed 
against them. In light of this, the Second Circuit’s application of the doc-
trine in United States v. Darin is inappropriate. The Supreme Court should 
have granted certiorari and mandated that the Seventh Circuit’s application 
of the doctrine controls as it pertains to foreign defendants. With this stand-
ard in place, the U.S. court system will be able to adjudicate pressing issues 
concerning extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 
CHLOE S. BOOTH 
                                                                                                                           
 191 Doyle, supra note 187, at 1. An astonishing number of federal criminal statutes are eligible 
for extraterritorial application however the number of prosecutions of foreign defendants under 
these statutes has been low. Id. Besides the obvious legal and practical hurdles that factor in in 
deciding whether to prosecute foreign defendants under U.S. federal criminal statutes, diplomatic 
concerns are another factor that may advise against exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id.; 
Ethan A. Nadelman, The Evolution of United States Involvement in the International Rendition of 
Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 813, 814 (1993). Even if the United States has a 
legal basis to obtain custody of a fugitive overseas, the decision on whether to exercise that au-
thority has primarily been hindered by “considerations of sovereignty, laws and political reactions 
of foreign states.” Nadelman, supra, at 814. Extradition is the most favored route of securing fugi-
tives, but it is not always an available option and at that point the government must consider nu-
merous factors in how to go about retrieving the fugitive. See id. 
 192 Golden, supra note 98. 
 193 See Brilmayer, supra note 187, at 17 (explaining the issues federal judges currently face in 
determining where a statute should apply to extraterritorial conduct). If a statute does not explicit-
ly say when and to whom it should apply, the court assuredly ends up relying on its own views in 
making a decision. Id. Without explicit direction from Congress on correct application, it would 
be proper to interpret the statute in a manner the court finds most palatable. Id. This results in 
different courts announcing different rules based on interpretation of the same statutes and does 
not provide uniform and predictable legal standards. See id. 
